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ABSTRACT
This thesis will examine the notion of the "virtual body" present in the work of Maurice
Merleau.Ponty, with particular attention paid to the Phenomenology ofPerception. For
Merleau-Pomy, the body is not, as it is in empiricism and idealism, a simple transmitter
of data for the mind. For Merleau-Ponty, the body must be seen as situated, that is, as a
lived body. The complex lived structures of the body, i.e., its operative intentionality.
memory, spatial and temporal orientation, all contribute to the way in which the body is
the "ground" of reflexive understanding. That is. for Merleau-Ponty, the pre-reflexive-
or, the lived body - grounds the reflexive. The body figures in consciousness, and in
understanding, in a developmental way. Rather than seeing consciousness and
understanding as a fonnal "object positing' system, Merleau-Ponty maintains that it is
relational and cannot be understood apart from its phenomenal field. Perception is the
best expression of this relational structure, for when we perceive and understand objects,
we carry forward all our bodily experience - Merleau-Ponty calls it the "body image"-
and this allows for the concurrent working out and clarification of meaning. This body
image, or virtual body, can be examined well through the film experience. So, as
Merleau-Pomy suggests, we will look to film, for, as Merleau-Ponty puts it in "The Film
and the New Psychology": "[l)he movies are well suited to make manifest the union of
mind and body, mind and world, and the expression of one in the other·'
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The Darkness in the Theater; Merleau-Ponty and Film
The body is the darkness in the theater that
is needed to show up the performance. (PP 101)
Introduction
What does the body do in the film theater? This is a seemingly simple question The
body sits in a rather uncomfortable chair. Our sense perception allows us "access" to the
images on the screen and the sounds that surround us in the theater. Visual perception is,
it will probably be said, the sense most stimulated in the cinema. The film is a
celebration of vision when compared, for instance, to a text or a song. But though these
statements have an element of truth to them, they do not convey the whole story of the
body in the theater. For Maurice Merleau-Ponty, "the body is the darkness in the theater
that is needed to show up the perfonnance." This paper will examine what this statement
means for Merleau-Ponty, and in so doing, will, as Merleau.Ponty does, re-state the
opening question: what does the drtual body do in the film theater? Or, to put it another
way, how is the body central to understanding and meaning?
Merleau-Ponty maintains that the body is often envisioned within a faulty account of
understanding. In this paper, we will explore how he conceives the relation between the
body and understanding. To this end, we will begin by examining Merleau-Ponty's use
of the notion 'representation', which is particularly prevalent in the Phenomenology of
Perception. Representation refers to the reduction of understanding to thought, where
thought refers to general and fonnal activity. A representational theory of understanding
centralizes cognition, making memory, for instance, the retention of concepts or "psychic
images." Memory, for Merleau-Ponty, is also an expression of the body's familiarity
with objects. Understanding and meaning depend on this familiarity as their ground, thus
they cannot be reduced to cognition. Merleau-Ponty instead maintains a theory of
activity in which the body-world relation precedes the immobilization of experience in a
cognition-object relation. The body's relationship to objecls is overlooked in a
represenational analysis, panially because the body is seen as one of the objects posited
by cognition rather than part ofa complex structure central to understanding. "Kant's
conclusion," Merleau-Ponty maintains, "was that I am a consciousness which embraces
and constirutes the world, and this reflective action caused him to overlook the
phenomena of the body and that of the thing" (PP 303)
For Merleau-Ponty, the reduction of understanding to thought is slrongly realized in
I 'analyse r-eflexive, or the idealist method of analysis. One implication of l'analyse
reflexive is, due the preoccupation of exposing and delineating the subject's essential
narure as cognition, the subject is understood as purely reflexive. Looking at the relation
between subject-object begins for I'analyse reflexive with the constituting subject. The
representational model, a central aspect of I 'analyse reflexive, makes experience and
understanding purely self-reflexive. What happens in perception, which for
Merleau-Ponty includes a complex body-world relation, is relegated to the realm of"the
cognitive". For Merleau-Ponty, this is a divisive approach to experience, and one which
rests, in some ways, on the matter-fonn relation.
For Merleau-Ponty, the relationship between subject and object cannot be seen in tenns
of a matter-fonn relation: the distinction between fonn and matter can no longer be given
any ultimate value. Merleau-Ponty rejects the classical distinction between matter and
fonn because he believes it reinforces the tendency to take the world as the collective
matter which consciousness fonns or gives meaning to in experience. Such a position, as
it is very well put by Jan Van der Veken, results in a "realism of brute existence" and "an
idealism of meaning" (Van der Veken, 322). For Merleau-Ponty, meaning emerges from
the subject-object relation, i.e., the constantly unfolding activity of the body subject with
the world. We experience the world from the vantage point oran embodied being. The
necessity of such a perspective makes it impossible to reduce meaning to a constituting.
cognitive subject.
I would like to draw an analogy with film to clarify what Merleau-Ponty means by
"reflexive". Susan Sontag writes: "[ilt's impossible ever to penetrate behind the fmal veil
and experience cinema unmediated by cinema" (Sontag, as quoted in Sobchack, 197)
Cinema, in Sontag's view, can never be exposed for what it is prior to the mediation of
cinematic images. The film is an event, an unfolding mediation, and thus, the film's
meaning can neither precede nor follow it. The meaning of a film can never be added by
the viewer, with little regard to the relation between the images, or the film's body. The
relation between the images of a film is the pre-reflexive ground of any subsequent
discussion. We try to articulate this relation using better or worse concepts.
Merleau-Ponty maimains that the subject can never be extracted from its perception
Perception, for Merleau-Pomy, includes the full range of the senses as they engage the
world. In other words, perception, as an expression of what it means to be a subject, can
never precede the subject. The attempt, by idealism or I 'analyse reflexive, to approach
experience through analyzing its conditions fails to recognize that the subject is always
an expression of mediation, perception - for Merleau-Ponty - being one, if not the central,
manifestation of this mediation. The purely "reflexive" subject necessarily precedes its
own mediation with the world. Seeing the subject as purely or essentially reflexive, is the
result of trying to see behind the "veil" of bodily perceptions, thereby eradicating them
Just as the body of the film is the film, and cannot be reduced, for example, to a
camera-filmmaker relation, the body of the subject is the subject, not an afterthought of
transcendental vision.
In {'analyse reflexive the full range and meaning of what it means to be a subject, which
includes bodily existence, is reduced to cognition. This reduced subject does not have a
body. The way the body comributes to understanding, the power or capability that results
from the body's familiarity with objects, is unexplored. It is specifically this point that
Merleau-Ponty seeks to explore by making perception primary
In the Phenomenology ofPerception, Merleau-Ponty seeks to expound the relevance of
perception as bodily, thereby overturning the reduction of understanding and experience
to thought. Perception has, Merleau-Ponty contends, traditionally been aligned with the
"higher order" functions of the subject, probably because we seem to have more control
over visual perception compared to other sense perception. The reflexive subject,
abstracted from its body, is alone seen to retain a united experience of the world. Such an
approach fails to account for the structure of experience. The body is a limit, a site, a
perspective, a relationship with specific objects in the world (not simply red, rail, etc. but
the sunset I watch from my balcony from a distance). At the same time, the body also
affords what Merleau-PonlY calls the openness of Being. The body is open, a
being-towards the world, not just a reflexive experience of the world, and as such, it is
potent.
Visual art, and more particularly for our purposes here, film, otTers a unique example of
the body's activity. The film is unique not least in that it is a relationship in which
meaning cannot easily be reduced to the subject's constitution. The film offers, in many
respects, a new configuration of objects. More important is the fonnat of film: it is a two
dimensional moving image. In order to have a "three dimensional experience" of the
images of the screen, in shon, to understand what is happening in this newly configured
space, the subjcct needs a body. But the body does not "need a body" in the sense that
the subject is something above and beyond its body. Rather, for Merleau-Ponty, the body
never acts as a transmiuer- it is pan of the understanding process, as a power, a capability
which reaches beyond materialist and idealist limitations. The cinema is a good place to
see what the body's power is for Merleau-Pomy, for in the theater the body has a power
that is not expressed by movement from place to place, or as a transmitter orthe "given",
but by the power afforded by the movement of the gaze, and the subsequent visual tactile
unity that constitutes the power of the virtual body for Merlcau-Ponty
Thus, the usc of film in relation to Merleau-Ponty is merited in that we can most readily
see the ramifications ofa virtual body in the cinema. For Merleau-Ponty - we will say
somewhat mysteriously for now - the virtual body inhabits the screen. Any remnants of
the "theater of the mind" are done away with. Instead, we encounter a theory in which
"the body is the darkness in the theater that is needed to show up the perfonnance". We
will, in this paper, discuss how the body is needed as a central part of understanding, To
this end film will be used in three ways: I) as an experience (the relation between screen
and viewer) 2) as an art fonn (the structure of the film) and, less so, 3) as an example (the
situations and experiences encountered in the film).
In what follows, I will explore Merleau-Ponty's idea of the borly's power or potential- a
power which cannot be understood under the traditional acceptance of a mind - body
dualism, Through vinuality, or, more specifically, the notion ofa virtual body,
Merleau-Ponty questions the traditional role of the body as material or, as is sometimes
the case with visual perception, sense collapsed into cognition. The virtual capUlres how
the body acts "at a distance", in such a way that the history of bodily experience - my
unified visual-tactile history of the world - and the development of concepts, are carried
forward and projected toward our present experience. The body is elevated by
Merleau.Ponty to the level of understanding, in which memory, anticipation, desire, and
consciousness in general are pan ofa complex system which has a complex bodily
component.
I have divided my thesis into three chapters. Chapter One, "Movemelll, Time and the
Intentional Body", will discuss Merleau-Ponty's attilUde toward the representationalist
reduction of understanding to self-reflexivity. Merleau-Ponty's rejection of
represenational thinking, and its centralizing ofa cognitive, constituting subject, is
revealed with his recurrent focus on "presence". We will discuss the empiricist and
idealist preoccupation, as Merieau-Ponty sees it, with the "origin" and certainty of
concepts over situated existence. Merleau-Ponty maintains that understanding depends
on the rdation between body and world as they are mutually present in situated existence.
Chapter One gives a detailed description of the spatial and temporal implications of
situated existence, and indicates how understanding and the body are related. For
Merleau-Ponty the relation between the body and understanding manifests itself in the
operative intentionality of the body. Thus, we will end Chapter One with a discussion of
the operative intentionality of the body, and finally how operative intentionality relates to
orientation. The relationship Merieau-Ponty fonnulates between intentionality and
orientation articulates a new kind of action for the body in that oriented perception counts
as action, and intentionality is not seen as reflexive deliberate actions but it includes, for
Merleau-Ponty, an operative dimension. Because we cannot but see the body as a whole
entity, the entire body acts in perception. We can look at perception as the unification of
the image and movement, but the meaning of the image is not judged in relation to
ntental representations, Rather, for Merleau-Ponty, the image-body relation always
occurs in situated existence, and is the ground of reflexive thought. In Chapter One, we
consider the idea thai understanding has a bodily component. The bodily component is
not as a transmitter separate from the higher functions of "the mind". Rather, as
perception shows, the body has an intentional structure which, in a complex way, grounds
reflexivity.
Chapter Two, "What Perception Is", will discuss Merleau-Ponty's integration of the
visual and the tactile. He maintains that the tactile component of perception has either
been overblown (i.e. The Cartesian model of vision is after the sense of touch in tenus of
physical contact) or reduced, i,e., as when sense is made into intellection, and visual
perception is "inflated" to cognitive functioning. There is no union of the visual and the
tactile, in shon no unified bodily being. Part of the problem is that we root the tactile to
the spot; we fail to see it in tenus of possibility and, rather tether it to the surface of the
body. By re-intcgrating the visual and the tactile, Mcrleau-Ponty gives the body back its
power of potential; the tactile power of the body is not snuffed out when not in action in
relation to a specific object. By maintaining that situated presence is an active part of
visual perception, Merleau-Ponty overturns the idealist notion that I constitute the world
(i.e., vision gives up a spectacle "spread out before me", and "I have the feeling of being
immediately present everywhere and situated nowhere." (PP 15»)
Merleau-Ponty's reintegrated unified body is captured by his notion of the "virtual". In
Chapter Three, "Habit Gesture and the Acquisition of Meaning", we will discuss the
significance of the body in relation to meaning. Meaning is related to bodily being, for
Merleau-Ponty, through acquiring and developing what he calls habit. Habit "is neither a
fom} of knowledge nor an involuntary action" (PP 144) - that is, habit, as the acquisition
of meaning, is an expression of the body now unified with understanding. The ·'body
image" is Merleau-Ponty's tenn for the unified history of experience, no longer the
domain of only the mind through representational structure. Gesture, the contonions and
subtle variations of bodily expression, is used by Merleau-Ponty to maintain that meaning
is ·'directly" accessible in perception. That is, there is no intennediate representational
structure, nor can sense perception be seen as a transmitter. Rather, the activity of the
body-subject is relational in structure: we must look at the relations between subjects and
others.
For Merlcau-Ponty, meaning always emerges from the relationship between the subject
and the given, but in a markedly different way than the Kantian given is present in
l'analyse reflexive. There is no "raw" brute given world which precedes the human
subject. Again, Merleau-Ponty makes the connection between meaning and the body
with his notion of habit Meaning emerges from non-constituting experience which is
specific to the human body and to the situations we continually inhabit. Our experience
of the gesture is a case in point, as is the film experience. The meaning of the gesture, the
subtle contonion of the face in anger, for instance, is not something "found" prior to or
behind the gesture; it is not a sign which we "really" experience through representation
and reflection, but is the gesture itself. The angry gesture is present to us as anger.
Similarly, the film "is" what it means: "The meaning ofa film is incorporated into its
rhythm just as the meaning of a gesture may immediately be read in that gesture: the film
does not mean anything other than itself' (FNP 58). Thus, "the joy of an lies in its
showing how something takes on meaning - not by referring to already established and
acquired ideas but by the temporal or spatial arrangements of clements" (FNP 58). This
arrangement of elemems is accomplished by whm many philosophers are hesitanllO
afford or extend to our bodily being: a complex structure of understanding
Merleau-Ponty affords such a structure to the body, as we will see, not least in that he
rejects the distinction between the reflexive and the non-reflexive.
Merleau-Ponty's notion of the gesture resists the placing of meaning above and beyond
the body-world relation. "The meaning of gesture is not behind it, it is intenningled with
the structures of the world outlined by the gesture itself - as in perceptual experience, the
significance of the fireplace does not lie beyond the perceptible spectacle, namely the
fireplace itself as my eyes and movements discover the world" (PP 185-186). My eyes
and movements do not discover the world as part of a higher reprcsemmional structure of
consciousness. Because meaning is a development and expression of prior experience
(habit) which is also always new experience (in-habiting), it necessarily involves viewing
understanding and the body as unified
For Merleau-Ponty, we can only understand the body as a unity, as an ongoing
integration of past and potential experience. The whole lived body is an intentional body,
in that even when it is not in action, it can always be called to action. In this sense, for
Merleau-Ponty, the body is virtual. In "The Virtual Body", the conclusion to this paper, [
will discuss the virtual body in Merleau-Ponty's work, and how it contributes 10 his
making the body an active part of understanding . Without the virtual aspect of the body's
existence, we could never understand that which we have never precisely encountered
10
before, a power which is ingrained in the body's activity. That the body has this kind of
potenlial for Merleau-Ponty is telling; such a view does not allow the body to be reduced
as in scientific materialism, to a set of facts or states of affairs. While the body is limited
by that which is open to it, that which fonns its field of action, Merleau-Ponty extends the
field of action, through perception, beyond the material: "the human body is defined in
tenns of its property of appropriating, in an indefinite series of continuous acts,
significant cores which transcend and transfigure its natural powers" (PP 194). The
body, in so far as it is a virtual body, resides in what Merleau-Ponty calls the "chiasm"
between the rationalist poles of res cogitans and res extensa, thereby rendering such
polarity obsolete. Furthennore, the body cannot be reduced to the mental or the physical;
it is neither as flesh or mind that we can understand perception.
Chapter I: Movement, Time and the Intentional Body
The movies are well suited to make manifest
the union of mind and body, mind and world,
and the expression of one in the other.
Merleau-Ponty, "Film and the New Psychology"
1.0 The Science of Representation and Merleau·Ponty's Philosophy of Presence
According to {'analyse reflexive, or, as Merleau.Ponty also calls it, intellectualism, the
source of undemanding is aligned with mental representation: recognition, memory: the
realm of the psychic image. The body, beyond the role ofa transmitter of data for the
mind to cognize, is largely left out. Merleau-Ponty's work seeks to explore and destroy
the traditionally accepted rift between the psychic image and the body found in leading
philosophical notions of understanding, those that reduce or conflate the body to thought.
He seeks to reintegrate the body and consciousness, the latter of which has been seen as,
largely, opposed to the fonner. Once we get beyond looking at understanding through a
representational model, we can return to the presence of the body, and how it contributes
to understanding and meaning.
The subject as an agent of organization and constitution is present in empiricist and
idealist theories of experience. Idealism traces experience back to its conditions. The
meaning of perception is located in the subject, a subject that becomes the source for
perception in so far as what is seen is experienced as meaningful in a purely reflective
manner- Empirical inquiry, in order to explain that we have a unified experience ofthe
world of atomistic "impressions", creates faculties such as "association", which are
purely interior forces. Accordingly, as impressions, mental representations of the object
are broken down and reconfigured by the subject in understanding. In each case, Ihat of
idealism and empiricism, meaning is seen 10 arise from the representational powers of
thought.
For both idealism and empiricism, Ihe subject-object relation is replaced with an
explanation of the subject's constitution of the world as meaningful. For Merleau-Ponty,
this reductive immobilization of the precept partially stems from the Cartesian roots
which both philosophical traditions share, roots which call for clarity and distinctness. In
both cases certainty is the starting point of analysis. The need to account for the certainty
of the data of perception prevails, even though these phenomena are, in the end, deemed
outside the range of reason. Merleau-Pomy, conversely, embraces ambiguity as a central
tenet of his philosophy. Activity cannot be exhausted by analysis, and, for
Merleau~Ponty activity, namely the activity occurring between subjects and objects, is
central. This activity has, as part of its structure, the bodily relation we have to objects.
For Merleau-Ponty the relation between body subjects and objects in the world is where
meaning arises. For this reason, we can say that Merleau-Ponty's is a philosophy of
presence rather than of certainty.
As a philosophy of presence, the ongoing relation between subject and object is
meaningless outside the situations that make it up. Being situated means being, among
lJ
other things, a body subject with tasks, etc, For Mer!eau-Ponty, the search for certainty
inhibits understanding our total engagement with the world as situational. Merleau.Ponty
sees the separation of certainly from the situated presence of the subject as a bypassing of
the importance of our fund of bodily experience. This fund of bodily experience is
inlegralto understanding
Focusing on the idea of the lived structures of the body in the world, let us imagine a
"cinema man", someone who grew up in the cinema. Even ifhe sat, from the moment of
birth, chained in fronl ofa film screen (like the denizens in Plato's cave), and
experienced the chair filmatically, he would understand some things about the chair He
would no doubt understand the chair as something to sit on. He would probably
recognize it if he were finally let outside. But while, in this scenario, a cinema man may
have a minimal understanding of the chair (linguistically, psychologically. etc.) would he
not, once outside the cinema, have problems "interacting" with it? Another example may
help here. If a woman is born blind and miraculously becomes sighted, she does not
immediately see the world as having visual continuity and meaning: she fonnally knew
the world only through her other senses. Vision blinds her just as much as blindness did,
in a different way. Dimension, depth, movement, space would blind the man born in
Plato's cave or in the cinema. The blind man who has his sight restored cannot "see"
what he touches while the cinema man would have problems touching what he sees. The
shared problem is the lack of an integration of the senses, the lack of integration of vision
and touch. This lack of integration will be explained in Chapter Two. For now, we
understand that iflhe presence is limited 10 cognitive ability the result is a subject with no
14
field of action open to it. Let us look at another film scenario in order to better
understand what a limited field of action could mean.
In Werner Herzog's The Enigma a/Kasper Hauser, a child grows up in an
"experimental" space, with no contact with anything but the hand that feeds him. When
he gets out, he is unable to distinguish between objects that "move themselves" (like
people) and those that are moved. At one point he believes that an orange is "running
away" from him. Having had no unified experience between vision and touch, the
patient, no matter how many times he has been told by his examiners, fails to understand
what movement is. The authority of understanding has no merit if the body is not
involved in it. In other words, without the integrated vision touch of the body subject,
without taking the presence of the body into account, thought and movement become
artificially separated. Merleau-Ponty seeks to refigure the relation between thought and
movement in the lived subject and seeks to understand how meaning arises through the
relation of body and world, rather than from their separation into transmitter (body) and
organizer (mind).
Space, movement, depth, etc. are not representations to be used and recalled by cognition.
They are bodily. "Movement is not thought about movement, and bodily space is not
thought of or represented··. (PP 137) Without a unified body presence one would be
unable to live in a unified or coherent way outside the cinema. I would argue the same
back again, that without a unified bodily history, one would be unable to watch a film. In
other words, for MerJeau-Ponty, {he tenn "presence" denotes nOI the perfonnance of
15
syntheses by a constituting subject, interacting with that which is "present to thought",
but encountering the world as a situation, being toward the world as a unified subject
who has had projects, tasks, etc. Being present is being, as he calls it, "open" to the
world. Thus, "the body is a system which is open to the world, and correlative with it".
(PP143)
Being open to the world is being open to that which counts or has meaning for us. We
will look more closely at Merleau-Ponty's notion of "counting" in Chapter Three.
Merleau-Ponty's understanding of meaning can be seen in light of his dependence on
Gestalt psychology and the centrality of the figure-background relation. Sensation,
understood within the relation of a figure on a background, cannot be separated into
qualities (red, wann, etc.), i.e., the treatment which sensation receives when it is reduced
by analysis "Once sensation is introduced as an element of knowledge" in this way,
... the red is not this wann color that 1 feel
and live and lose myself in but it announces
something else which it does not include ... It
exercises a cognitive function. Hencefonh the red
is no longer merely there, it represents something
for me, and what it represents is not possessed as
a 'real pan' of my perception, but only aimed at
as an 'intentional pan'.(PP 13)
Under this analysis, my gaze "ranges over and dominates" the object (PP 13). Intention,
collapsed into cognition, aims at the object and in so doing "gives" it meaning.
Merleau-Ponty claims that the world is not by and large given meaning by us, by our
intentions and constructions, (as the film image cannot be reduced to language structures
as it is in semiotics, or subconscious memories as it is in psychoanalysis). Being in the
world, the body "merges" with things and it is in this merging that meaning is expressed.
Every perception expresses and re-enforces my open connection to the world. Being
open is a mode not of cognition, then, but of being - and being in the world involves the
body. "One's own body is always the third tenn in the figure background structure." (PP
101)
The significance of the figure-background Structure, and how the body is the third tenn,
can be approached as we contemplate what a Canesian film theory would look like.
What would happen if the thinking thing went to a movie in the extended world?
Under a Canesian film theory, both the body and the screen would be considered
extension, rather than an integrated part of understanding. With no distinction between
the body as perspective and the screen as a site, there can be no projection of the
spatio-temporal experience of the body onto its field of action. In fact there could be no
"being-towards", no relational structure whatsoever. Without relationality, without the
projection of the ongoing meaning inherent in the body's unified visual-tactile experience
of the world, there could be no understanding of the relationship of a figure to its
background, particularly for the film experience. The film is a two dimensional projected
image. The figure-background relation of the film could not be translated into a
figure-background structure by a thinking thing. An integrated projection of
tactile-visual experience fills in the third dimension of the film's figure-background
structure. The body, the darkness in the theater, is essentially the background in every
figure-background structure. Descartes' cogito could never go to the movies.
The cogito could never, in other words, be "present". Even though:
my consciousness would penetrate the perceptual
world even to its most hidden articulations, the
perceived world would not have the density of
something present ... consciousness would not lose
itself or become caught up. (PP 257)
The subject does become caught up in the world. In Stanley Kubrick's A Clockwork
Orange, Alex is made to walch ultra violent films. He is unable to blink or look away
because his eyes are propped open. He is completely overwhelmed by the images. Our
eyes arc not propped open at the cinema, we can look away, even though we often do not
We are engaged with the image. Even if we close our eyes we hear the world, we can
louch it. Though the film experience serves well to exemplify the point, this "being
caught up" is not reserved for the cinema. The density, whal Merleau-Ponty also refers
to as the "thickness" of the body and the world, is really the always meaningful unity of
the body and the object in concrete interaction or living. We are not passive receptors of
sensation, transmitters of sense for knowledge: "To experience a structure is not to
receive it into oneself passively, it is to live it, to take it up" (PP258), We are unable to
disengage ourselves from the sensible. But this inability to disengage ourselves is not a
negative; we are simply and necessarily sensory beings. "A shadow passing or a
creaking of branches have a meaning. Everywhere there are warnings with no one who
issues them" (PP 290). We must refrain from "the natural attitude", that is, from
recognizing the connections between understanding and the body only by living them,
rather than trying, as Merleau-Ponty does, to describe these connections. We cannot,
however, deny that we are caught up in perception.
The body, for Merleau-Ponty "is a power, not a thing known" (PP 138). The general
negative claim of the Phenomenology ofPerception is that both idealist and empiricist
thought have taken reflective knowledge and consciousness to represent the entirety of
meaning and experience. Thus, for Merleau-Pomy, the adherence to representationalist
thinking is concerned with the products of analysis rather than lived experience. For both
intellectualist psychology and idealist philosophy "all meaning was ipsofaCIO an act of
thought" of a "pure J" (PP 147). "As long as consciousness is understood as
representation the only possible operations for it to perfonn are representations" (PP
139). Hence, cinema man's problem when trying to sit on a chair, and the thinking thing's
problem with watching a film.
Merleau-Ponty advocates a move outside the Cartesian idea of consciousness as "thought
wrapped up in itself' (PP 49) to what he calls a non-positing consciousness, meaning
consciousness which is not in full possession of itself and its operations. Perception,
accordingly, is an expression of the body's non-positing conscious understanding of the
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world: "The perception of our own body and the perception of external things provides an
example of non-positing consciousness" (PP 49). Before moving on to discuss
perception more specifically, we must see how the body as a non-positing consciousness
generally makes a contribution to experience and understanding. We will start, as
Merleau-Ponty does, with movement.
1.1 The Science of Lived Experience: Movement
Merlcau-Pomy proposes that "traditional views" are often based on a fonnula of
movement which "dissects movement imo a representation" (PP 138)."The project of
movement is composed", after this dissection,
of the representation of its parts or its immediate
aims: it is this representation that we have called
the fonnula of movement. Praxis is tom asunder by
representations and automatic actions. (PP 139)
We have established that neither the body nor understanding can be removed from the
presence of situation. This situatedness includes things as seemingly simple as the
distance between bodies and objects; "[d]istance springs into existence ahead of any
science" (PP 51). The relationship of the body to distance is not an objective relationship
but rather one which acquires significance and is constituted as it unfolds·
Just as there is no possibility of engaging in
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any discussion on the 'conservation of recollections',
but only of a certain way of seeing time which
brings out the past as an inalienable dimension of
consciousness, there is no problem of distance,
distance being immediately visible provided we
can tind the living present in which it is
constituted. (PP 266)
Thcre are different ways that the body involves distance, One way is that it creates
distance by covering space, it moves from one place to another. Another way is depth
perception, the oscillation oflhe gaze. This too is a fonn of movement, it is also
understanding. The gaze is in fact a very good expression of what it means for the body
to understand because, in considering the gaze, we do not get distracted, as in analysis, by
the act of moving from one place to another. Movement in this sense is easily, albeit
falsely, reduced to mechanism.
WithOUlthe aid of representation, our bodies know what the best, or what Merleau-Ponty
calls, the 'optimal' distance is from which to view an object. There is an optimal distance
and direction from which objects can be seen and touched, which we do not cognitively
choose, and which we cannot represent. In an art gallery we take in a picture so as to see
both the scale and the detail in the painting. fn the cinema, the distance from the screen is
not the end of the body's distance-interaction with the objects, as we will see when we
look at depth perception. Chapter Two will show that, for Merleau-Ponty, the whole
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body, both the visual and the tactile. is always active in each and every perception,
thereby overriding the rift between the psychic image and physical movement, and
offering instead Ihe situated subject. For now we will concentrate on the latter, slarting
with the notion that "to move one's body is to aim at things through it, it is to allow
oneself to respond to its call, independently of any representation" (PP 139).
To recapitulate some of the broad stokes of the argument up to now, understanding
cannot be seen as representational, as it is under ['analyse reflexive; the reason it has been
treated as such is in pal1 due to an "experience error" made by psychologists and
philosophers. This experience error consists of making understanding up from what
analysis sees as its origins (which are often conceived as cognitive) rather than from lived
experience. Part of the reason for this experience error is mind-body dualism, which
treats the body as the transmitter of sensations to Ihe mind, as a presenter of motor data.
Merleau-Ponty reintegrates consciousness and movement, rejecting the idea of
consciousness as cognition. He maintains that there is no representational relationship
between consciousness and movement. He questions any presumed causal connections
"'between" consciousness and the body, a connection Which, due to Ihe centralized
position of a cognitive subject, follows from a representational account of understanding
Let us look into a representationalist perspective on consciousness and movement in
more detail to understand what it is that Merleau-Ponty opposes. The view ofO. Sittig is
criticized by Merleau-Ponty in this context. For Sittig'
Consciousness will be motor as long as it furnishes
itself with a representation of movemen I. The body
then executes the movement by copying it from the
representation which consciousness presents to
itself, and in accordance with a formula of
movement which it receives from that representation,
(Sittig, as quoted in PP, 139)
For Merleau-Ponty, this general form of movement - understood under the idea of
causality - is faulty because it cannot account for movement in the world. Change of
position does not rely on representation: "motility ... is not the handmaid of
consciousness, transpoI1ing the body to that point in space of which we have formed a
representation beforehand" (PP 139). Merieau-Ponty contributes the following agenda to
Sittig's claim:
We still need to understand by what magical process
the representation ofa movement causes precisely
that movement to be made by the body. The problem
can be solved only provided that we cease to draw a
distinction between the body as a mechanism in itself
and consciousness as being for itself. (PP 139, fn 2)
This reasoning has to be carefully explored. How is a body to be understood as a
mechanism in itself? What, exactly, is consciousness as being for itself? We are faced,
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again, with a distinction between movement and thought, as well as the view ofthe body
as a machine which the mind runs. For Merleau-Ponty, the relationship between thought
and movement is non-causal: there can be no causal relation between the mind and the
body because they are not separately functioning entities. Consciousness as "for-itself' is
exhausted by purely cognitive functioning. Merleau-Ponty seeks to extend consciousness
to the body, which is not the receptor of the mind's action. He contends that if the mind
is not considered a separate entity from the body, we do not have to rely on the faulty
idea that the mind infonns or activates the passive body in movement or in any olher of
the subject's activities, "Consciousness is a matter of an I can, not an I think" (PP, as
quoted in Spieker, 259) But what can it mean 10 say that the body is conscious? It means,
for Merleau-Ponty, that we can eXlend the capabilities traditionally reserved and tailored
only for mind to the body. Memory, anticipation, and understanding are bodily, rather
than thinking the body in purely mechanical tenns. The "magical process" that "makes"
the body move is not causal, but is perception itself. Moving does not require an original
representation of movement. When 1 intend to look left, this movement of the eye carries
within it as its natural translation an oscillation of the visual field
"The movement to be perfornled can be anticipated, though not by representation" (PP
139). Movement is not anticipated by the mind, but perfonned. So what can the
movement be anticipated by? Anticipated by the body, movement is understood as it is
perfonned
If I am ordered to touch my ear or my knee, I move
my hand to my ear or my knee by the shonest route,
\vithout having to think of the initial position of my
hand, or that of my ear or the path between them ..
it is the body which 'understands' in the acquisition
of habit. This way of putting it will appear absurd,
if understanding is subsuming a sense-datum under
an idea, and if the body is an object. (PP 144)
But the body is not an object and the sense-datum is not subsumed under an idea. Rather,
the body is not mobile, nor is movement understood in relation to a concept of
movement, but in relation to "that highly specifie thing toward which we project
ourselves" (PP 138). And, "in order that we may move our body toward an object, the
object must first exist for it"(PP 139). In other words, movement is an expression of the
relationship between body-subjects and objects, not of concepts and bodies. We can see
this expressly cxemplified in the way understand movcmcnt whcn we watch a film.
In the cinema, we do not reach oUI to grab the railing like the character in the film falling
from a building. We do, however, anticipate the motivation, we jump in our seats, hold
our breath. How can we understand the possibility of falling, of failing to grip, of the
force of hitting the pavement? Is it because we impon from our "real" life this exact
experience? Of course nol. We ourselves have never been in this exact position before,
this is not a representation of anything we have experienced. Nor is it because we recall
the colors on the screen that we anticipate the fall. It is not because we know, for
instance, what a railing is. We see spomaneously, an event on the screen, not a collection
of representations along side each OIher. We understand because our bodies contain the
potential of doing all the things done on the screen. It is not according to hypothesis or
judgment but the way our bodies position themselves in the world that we understand
falling down. Again, "to move one's body is to aim at things through it, it is to allow
oneself to respond to its call, independently of any representation" (PP 139) The body
anticipates the fall not by being reflectively conscious of the concept of falling, but by
projecting its own possibility of movement onto the objects it encounters on the screen
1.2 The Present and Presence: Time and the Body's Memory
I measure time by how a body sways.
T. Roethke., "I Knew a Woman"
The film image depends on succession for meaning, As Merleau-Ponty puts it in "Film
and the New Psychology": "the meaning of the shot depends on what directly precedes
it". In order for there 10 be continuity or meaning in the film, there must be unity.
Because each particular shOl directly precedes the particular shot anterior to it, and the
last shot in the film, then, contains and invokes the first. This is not a causal connection
The first shot in the film does not cause the last,just as my birth did not cause me to
watch the film. The moments in the film are not in time but are temporally linked images
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which move together and into each other. The removal of one image will throw off the
whole thing, will make it into a different film. Take for example, Fritz Lang's film M. A
long shot of the clock on the wall is interspersed with shots of a mother waiting for her
little girl to come home - which we know in the next few shots will never happen. The
placement and duration of the shot serves to invoke the worried countenance of the
mother due to the lateness of the child. Merleau-ponty maintains "t[]he technique of the
film is pre-objective par excellence" in that
the essence of the motion picture is that it conveys
the meaning of the scene through the rhythm (the
duration and sequences) of the shots. Thus it
reproduces the way that meaning emerges through the
organization of experience. (SN xiv)
The shots have a definite order and organization, a temporal organization It is the
essence of the film that the shots follow each other, and thereby acquire meaning. Two
frames can never be on the screen at the same time, for the screen is the frame in which
the film must unfold.
I can never be at two places at one time J am always situated, which means I am always
situated now, but this now is always in the context of being 'on my way', having 'come
from', etc. Thus, another aspect of the relationship between non-representational
understanding and situated presence, which we have seen includes movement, is time,
temporal succession. The relationship between movement and time includes a relation to
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the new. Understanding is progressive rather than formal and complete. In this way,
understanding is temporal, rather than, as it is for the intellecrualist, "having" time as a
condition of experience. Kant, we remember, describes time as the "inner form" of
intuitIOn.
"In the present, being and consciousness coincide' (PP 424) With his rejection of kinds
of analysis that reduce the contents of experience 10 origins, Merleau-Ponty realigns that
which is always both new and original (origin-al), what I will call present/presence. He
believes being and knowledge culminate in the working of the body as present/presence.
Let us look further into Merleau-Ponty's notion of temporality, and its relationship to
preselll-presence.
The "new presence", the image, in the film is not, in experience, reserved for cognition,
as it is under a strictly representationalist analysis. The image is not just a reminder of
past "presents", the instigator of the construction of objective fonnulas for understanding.
Such a view reduces experience to knowledge and equates sensation with the reflective
consciousness of sensation. For Merleau-Ponty time and presence are interrelate<!
Presence is not to be subsumed under that which is presented to or "given" to thought, as
it is, for instance, in Kant's philosophy. Nothing is "given" in this way; there are no
isolated given presents which are categorized, then, by the understanding. For
Merleau-Pomy, "the given" object and the "given to" or the subject are related,
connected, by what they share; they share body, they share being seen and seeing,
moving and being moved toward, in short they are mutually present. "There is a
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presence 10 the world", writes Merleau-Ponty, "that is older than intelligence". This
presence to the world is, for Mer1eau-PonIY, that of the body Merleau-Ponty uses the
experience of movement to illustrate this:
Our bodily experience of movement is not a
panicular case of knowledge, it provides us with
a way of access to the world and the object with a
prakrognosia which has to be recognized as original
and perhaps primary. (PP 140)
The access to the world which is "original and perhaps primary" is the body's past. This
primary past is not a concrete memory or a set of pre-conceivable categories and fonns of
thought or intuition. It is not possible to think of temporal succession, of the development
ofa primary past, in terms of conditions of experience, Rather, it is a past which only
ever has meaning ifit is, at the same time, seen within the context of the body's situated
presence. "Co-existence, which in fact defines space, is not alien to time. The order of
co-existents is inseparable from the order of sequences or rather, time is not only the
consciousness of sequences." (PP 265) This presence is always only meaningful as it
unfolds within the context of new engagements, /lew presents. "At each successive instant
of movemem, the preceding instam is not lost sight of, the body draws them together, on
the basis of its present position." (PP 140) In shon, the body is a living past. Rather than
being the master of its domain, like the ego of the idealists, the body is equally imprinted
with the past ofthe world ("the past sets its mark upon us" (PP413)) as it makes its own
imprint. Merleau-Ponty maintains that this presence to the world is ambiguous (i.e" it
cannot be laid out, for instance, in either fonnal conditions or in purely mechanical
tenns). This ambiguity, the fact that "we cannot deliver consciousness from all its
opacity" (PP 242) is not negative. We fail to have a concept-idea of it because it is open
and always ongoing, a succession. It is a living "sense of the past" that is always rooted
in the sensible but it cannot be reduced to the sensible. "We feel the past behind us as an
incontestable acquisition". (PP421) A living sense is not representable in the way
analysis represents it. Nor can the bo<ly's memory translate into conditions of experience
for it is the unfolding ofa past that will never explicitly catch up to it; it is always
sustaining itselfin activity. The body's past is, as Merleau-Ponty puts it, "a past that has
never been present" (PP 242).
The body is a living memory. "I can take in a certain period of my past life only by
unfolding it anew." (PP 423) In other words, to remember is not just to recollect isolated
moments in past-time; it is, rather, to constantly affinn the future as pan of the mutual
presence of body and world by living the past. Edward Casey describes it thus
The first pre-reflectivity makes possible the second,
while the latter takes up and catTies forward what
has already been accomplished (and what is currently
being accomplished) by the body. (Casey, 54)
As Merleau-Ponty writes'
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Once again, time's "synthesis" is a transition-
synthesis, the action of a life which unfolds, and
there is no way of bringing it about other than by
living that life, there is no seat of time, time
bears itself on and launches itself afresh. (PP 424)
Merleau-Ponty maintains that the body, as original presence, has never beenpresenl,
meaning the body can never be seen as acting here and now as a simple transmitter- its
history, its memory must be taken into account. "When I understand a thing, a picture for
example, r do not here and now effect its synthesis, I come to it bringing my sensory
fields and my perceptuallield with me." (PP 429)
Jfwe think of present in a representationalist sense, as "given to thought", a presence that
has never been present may sound contradictory. This is not true, however, if presence is
regarded as living, as existence. That is, the originary past is not a pure or absolute past,
like a condition of experience. It is a living past. It has never been present because it has
always been presence itself. It is never present because it can never be congealed into an
absolute present. The body cannot be understood unless it is understood in the process of
a total life experience.
With the notion of an originary past that has never been present Merleau-Ponty overturns
Kant's conditions of possible experience. Experience cannot be exhaustibly traced back
to conditions. The discovery of such conditions cannot unlock and exhaust experience
because the conditions transcend the field of immanence, of existence, that it tries to
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explain Being-in-the-world or existence, and the body's past, are one
Neither the body nor existence can be regarded as
the original of the human being, since they presuppose
each other, and because the body is solidified or
generalized existence, and existence a perpetual
incarnation. (PP 166)
My connection and access to the past is not, then, purely cognitive. "lfthe past were
available to us only in the fonn of express recollections we should continually be tempted
10 recall it in order to verify its existence." (PP 418) Through the structures of the body's
activities, through movement, for example, I live the past. The notion of presence
captures the double life of the body for Merleau-Ponty; it is at once a ground and that
which it grounds, which means it is a primary and constant, living, expression of
existence, neither anterior nor consequent. The traditional distinction between active
mind and passive body (having a pure "T" precede and condition existence) is displaced
by the notion of the lived body. As "a network of intentionali ties" rather than "a line"
(PP 414), time resists being used as a transcendent tool for organizing existence into a
causal ground-grounded relation. Funhennore, as primary, original presence, the body
does not simply replace the mind as the central control center of existence. It is nOI a
fonnal, pure body-subject that Merleau-Ponty wants to uncover - this does not exist
because "every movement is insolubly, movement and consciousness of movement" (PP
110)
Hence rellection does not ilselfgrasp its full
significance unless it refers to the unreflective
fund of experiences which it presupposed, upon which
it draws and which constitutes for it a kind of
original past, a past that has never been present. (PP 242)
1.3 Space and Orientation
Everything throws us back to the organic relationship
between subject and space, to that gearing of the
subject onto his world his world that is the origin
of space ... clear perception and assured action is
only possible in a space that's oriented. (PP 251)
The relationship of the past and the future would have no connection to our present
situated experience without the body in that temporal succession is intimately linked to
movement. And, for Merleau-Ponty, the body is not "in" space. Nor is space a form of
inlUition. Rather, space, for Merleau-Ponty, is lived, Without the history of succession
and movement afforded by the body, we would be unable to understand a newly
configured space. Whether it is something we have experienced before or something we
have never before encountered, the body affords the subject an oriented, thus integrated,
understanding of the world, unlike the subject of f 'analyse reflexive
Orientation is an expression of the body's power. But the body's power is more than the
ability to follow the direction of a path called forth by the mind or by an object. Both the
possibility and the limitations of movement are contained, in pan, in the direct
visual-tactile relation between the world of objects and the body, a relationship which
cannot be reduced to a representational structure, in which there is no need for oriented
space, thus no need for a body. Orientation replaces the causal framework laid out by a
representationalist analysis. "Clear perception and assured action is only possible in a
phenomenal space which is oriented" (PP 251).
Like time, the pans of the body are not laid out in a linear fashion. "The parts are laid out
in a peculiar way, they are not laid out side by side but are enveloped in each other" (PP
98). That is, the body can never be seen as anything other than a whole, just as
understanding can never be seen as involving anything but a unified subject, rather than a
disembodied collection of mental representations. "[We] are always able to take our own
bearings wilhout having to cast the mind back" (PP 100), and "[b]odily space envelopes
its parts instead of spreading them out." (PP 101) Envelopment refers to the way that the
body must always be seen in relation to an interconnected system of spatial
configurations, which correspond to the way in which the borly is arranged, the way it
envelops itself and its surroundings. Let us return to the cinema for an example. In the
cinema we experience spatial relationships between ourselves and the screen, such as the
close up of lngmar Bergman, the wide, sweeping landscapes of Chinese cinema. Among
other things, one spatial factor which remains constant in both experiences is the size and
shape of the screen, i.e. the same measurable distance lies between the top ofLiv
Ulmann's head and her chin in Bergman's Persona as lies between the sky and the earth
inXiu Xiu. It is the same distance between the screen and the body of the viewer, ifl sit
in the same row and seat. The difference lies not in a different linear arrangement, but,
rather, in the different configuration of the spacc, a configuration which only makes sense
in relation to the background of the body's experience. I recognize Livas a person, even
though sometimes I can only see her eyes on the screen in front of me. I can also
recognize the wide shot as a field. In both cases, it is not my body as transmitter that is
the issue (even though my vision mayor may not be 20/20). Rather, I understand both of
these relations due to my past bodily orientation. The relationship between the close up
and the far away is not an abstract conceptual one, but can only make sense from the
point of view ofa body in relation to objects within varying vicinities. Thus, the mind
does not alone understand the spatial configuration of an object (of which the close up is
an example). Rather, the body (or more precisely, the body-subject) is already toward
objects in a meaningful way due to its oriented being.
Merleau-PonlY maintains that "[tJhe relegation of direction to the mind is the
intellectualist mistake" (PP 249). The realist mistake, he claims, is "using the visual
spectacle as the source of directions in space" (PP 249). Distance serves as an apt
example again. The film, for instance, does not, in itself, offer the fixed point we need in
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order to understand orientation. Direction and movement, in short, orientation, involve
more than a relation between the two points of subject and object. "Among two things,
two points are not enough to establish a direction." (PP 246) Direction in French
translates as "sens", meaning sense, significance, and direction. Direction does not have a
source "in" space, but is expressed relationally:
The points in space do not stand out as objective
positions in relation to the objective position
occupied by our body; they mark, in our vicinity,
the varying range of our aims and our gestures.
(PPI43)
The body, even considered as a point, is never immobile (as objects may be). Even if the
hand does not here and now move, its potential for movement renders it always mobile.
What it means to cover the distance between the body and an object goes beyond
"physical" movement. Spatial levels, for Merleau-Ponty, replace the fixed points of
geometrical (Euclidean) space. Instead of being measurable in tenns of poinIS, "vision
and movement always occur in relation to previo!lsly given spatial levels."
As we will discuss in Chapter Two, the relationship between the visual and the tactile
means the body always acts as a totality; to perceive something is to take the body's past
and unfold it anew, always in relation to the spectacle. This changes what action means.
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Being oriented does not simply mean that there is an arbitrary range of aClion available
for the cognitive subject to choose, but that this pre-objective range of action is built into
the body's ongoing relationship with objects.
"Space". Merleau-Ponty writes, "escapes us from above". That is, because space is
intimately related to the body, we cannot regard it as having another, purely cognitive
accessibility, which transcends the body's ongoing connection with the world. The
spatiality and temporality of the body are expressed in the body's living connection to the
world, i.e., in terms of the body's ongoing relation to "situations": time exists for me
because I am situated in it. Being situated is juxtaposed against the idea, based on
centralizing Euclidean space, of occupying "pure positions" or qualified regions, We do
not apply spatial measurement 10 the world, just as we do not apply representations to
experience. "Being situated in relation to an environment ,.. alone gives significance to
the directions up and down in the physical world," (PP 284) Situation, thus, cannot be
conceived as "the indivisible system governing the acts of unification performed by a
constituting mind·' (PP 244). Situation is only meaningful as being situated. Situation
does not provide the background for the acts of cognition; it is pan of the pre-reflective
ground of cognition (which, as we have seen, is not temporally prior).
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1.4 The Operative Intentionality of the Body
For Merleau-Ponty's work, orientation is closely connected to intentionality. To
understand what he means by originary or primary body space (the field of both present
and possible action) we must tum to his concept ofinlentionality. What intentional link
do we have with objects? For Husserl, "intentionality ... ponrays our relation to the
world as the conscious and self-conscious idea or mental representation of things"
(Johnson, 27). Merleau-Ponty rejects such an account of intentionality. The word
intentionality is derived from the Latin "intentio" which means tension or stretching, nol
unlike the "intentional threads" or "lines afforce" (PP 48) which, as we will explore,
involve our bodily relationship with objects. In other words, intentionality is a mode of
being. Zanerwrites
Intentionality is not a descriptive characteristic of
any mental process in vinue of which there is
consciousness of. For Merleau-Ponty it constitutes
the being of consciousness, the fact that
consciousness in is in the world. It is always
attached by tasks. (Zaner, 156)
The relation between intention and action is a difficult issue. What most approaches to
this issue have in common, however, is the idea that intention is fundamentally cognitive.
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Action follows the intention to act. Put generally, desire, belief, and motives precede the
act, which is carried out on a specific object. In other words, before an action is
perfonned, the goal is seen as held "in mind". In "volition theory", "mental action
theory", and the "causal theory" of Donald Davidson, the impetus of the action, and the
"site" of intention, is the mind. This is not the case for Merleau-Ponty. The goal cannot
come before the possibility of action that is taken to reach that goal. Thus we do not so
much have the goal (e.g. opening the door) "in mind" before we do it, without having the
goal, as Merleau-Ponty puts it "well in hand." We need not expressly recall opening
doors in order to open this one, The weight of the past "weighs upon me with all its
weight, it is there, and though I may not recall any detail of it, I have the impending
power to do so, I still have it in hand" (PP 416).
"We must grant man a very special way of being - intentional being - which consists in
being oriented towards all things but not residing in any." (SN 72) The idea that
intentionality is "towards all things" overrides, according to Merleau-Pomy, thinking of
intentionality as exercised in individual mental acts. Intentionality, it may be said, first,
is not goal oriented. Merleau-Ponty identifies the mistake in the meaning of intentionality
(in fact, in meaning in general) with conceiving it as a goal coming to fruition (Le., the
synthesis ofa particular object). "We say that events have a meaning when they appear
as the achievement or the expression ofa single aim" (PP 428). Intentionality is seen, on
this view, to involve acts of significance (PP 428). The goal coming to fruition
detennines whether it is significance, whether or not it is intentionally valid.
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Intentionality would, thus, be the addition of express intentions. This idea of
intentionality bypasses what Merleau-Ponty sees as a more primordial presence.
Intentionality is not the construction of objects, it is not a process of signification, of
giving meaning.
Merleau-Ponty's alternative to what he calls this "intentionality of acts" or "thetic
intentionality", is "another kind which is the condition of the fonner's possibility,
namely, an operative intentionality already at work before any positing or judgment".
This operative intentionality is that of the body, it is, he says "beneath the intentionality
ofaets". (PP429)
Operative intentionality is original, primordial and the ground of the practical structures
of lived space. To say that this intentionality is benearh the intentionality of express acts
is to say that it makes the express intentions or ')udgments" involved in activity possible.
Operative intentionality is the ground of their possibility - it is the "I can'·, the ability of
the body to take up "free spatial thought" (PP 104). All specific inlenlions, then, whether
it is moving from here to there, or pointing or grasping an object, have as their ground the
realm of possibility (in essence, the intentionality) directly afforded by the body. As the
originary past, the body has intentions that are conceptually prior to other judgements.
The body's intentionality is not, however, causally related or temporally prior to express
intentions; the body is always the lived body. We will explore what being "beneath" the
intentionality of acts means after discussing operative intentionality in more detail
A case study from the Phenomenology ofPerception makes it clearer what
Merleau.Ponty means by bodily or operative intentionality. Merleau.Ponty cites the case
of someone with psychic blindness, whose spatial range is limited. The patient is only
able to perfonn movements which apply to concrete or actual situations which he
habitually perfonns, unless he is looking directly at the limb that he is asked to move (PP
103). While he can grasp his nose (e.g. in the act of blowing it, etc.) he experiences
extreme difficulty pointing to it. That is, he is unable to anticipate and perfonn an act
unless he can place himself in a practical situation, one in which he knows the goal, and
its reason. What he has lost, then, is the full range of "anchorage" in his environment; he
has lost touch with his operative or bodily intentionality. His "I can" (the possibilities he
can actualize) is therefore inhibited. He must "know" the action in order to perfonn it
In nonnal movement, "bodily space may be given to me in an intention to take hold
without being given in an intention to know" (PP 104). The ability to recall, to
represent, does not give him a "whole" place in the world that bodily intentionality does
in a "nonnal" person. The patient with psychic blindness cannot perfono abstract
movements because he always needs to represent to himself a previous situation in order
to undertake the present one. "He places himself mentally in actual situations to which
(his movements] correspond." (PP 104) Because he cannot represent a full range of
movement in general, he cannot, say, point to his head, but he can scratch it. He is not
unlike our cinema man in this way, who can look at a chair but has trouble sitting on it.
1.5 The Relation between Spatial Orientation and Intentionality
'"The intentionalities which anchor me to an environment ... do not run from a central 'I'
but from my perceptual field itself' (PP 416). As "no causal relationship is conceivable
between the subject and the body, his world or his society", the perceptual field is not a
collection of objects "taken up" by perception, but something inhabited. The nature ofa
"perceptual field" will be explored in more detail in chapter two. For now it is important
to understand that the perceptual field is partially made up of the "spatial levels"
discussed above. Top and bottom are instances of spatial levels. Merleau-Ponty uses the
example of a mirror experiment 10 discuss the establishment of oriented spatial levels. In
a mirror that is held at a right angle, everything seems slanted at first. Soon, everything
seems vertical again, we "figure it out" so to speak. It is not the mirror that changes, and
we do not calculate the distances and see that it is the same room. It is also not that we
can go "into" the mirror and explore the room. "The redistribution of high and low is
thrown into relief without any motor exploration" (PP 248). The exploration is
accomplished by the perceiving subject, whose visual field motivates it. At first, we
seem to be dealing with new spatial levels, the man walking in the mirror, for instance,
seems to be walking slantwise. But soon our bodies fill in, if you will, the "gaps", and
reorient it to the new configuration. In the film "Moulin Rouge", the image contorts and
relaxes so quickly, that at first some viewers are so disoriented it is rather nauseating. The
camera zooms in to catch a shaky eye, pulls out again and pans back and back, through
the window beyond the entire city of Paris in a second, only to arrive again in the room in
which the scene was set. This does not happen in, as we say, "real life", We can orient
ourselves 10 this newly configured space, it has meaning, because our bodies can be up,
far, close, etc. I have never been in a room, then out of the city, then in a room again in a
matter of seconds (I have never, for that matter, been to Paris), but, as we will see. it is
my virtual body which still has the potential of understanding these situations
Without the possibility of spaliallevels offered by the body, up and down would be
meaningless (as would falling down, reaching up, etc.). Up and down are not just
concepts. But, and this is crucial, they are not just understood in concrete doing, as in the
psychic blindness patient. "The possession ofa body implies the ability to change levels
and understand space." (PP 251)
The body receives its orientation from the general
level of experience ... lilt remains to be seen
what precisely is this level that is always ahead of
itself, since every constitution of a level
pre-supposes a different pre-established level
(PP249)
It remains to be seen (literally) because we cannot set out determinate spatiallcvels in
advance as universal measures of movement. Up and down have no meaning on their
own (PP 249). As "beneath" (and not prior to) express intentions, the body's
intentionality acts at this most "general level of experience". The body ··plays an
essential pan in the establishment ofa lever' CPP 249). So while the act of establishing
spatial levels is ongoing, it is neither all accomplished beforehand by some eternal
measurement, nor is it reducible to the present interaction with objects here and now so to
speak. As ZaneT aptly puts it:
The physical space of empiricism lacks practical
structure: any teleological dimension would have
to be superimposed. The intentional structures of
purposiveness cannot be generated out of a purely
mechanical physiology. Although intellectualism can
account for the purposiveness of bodily movement in
tenns of the intentional structuring of space, it
fails to realize that the structures of practical
space cannot be reduced to the categories of a
disembodied consciousness. (Zaner, 136)
Space is, thus, not purely mechanical, i.e. it is not the relation between mute points Nor,
however, is it imposed by "the mind": it is not purely intentional. Merleau-Ponty
maintains that space cannot be so easily slotted into this kind of either/or. For
Merleau-Ponty, the body is intentional, in that orientation follows from the general spatial
level of experience afforded by the body's operative intentionality.
The relationship between space and vision is bodily. As we will see, the understanding
body includes for Mcrleau-Ponty the emergence of new conception of space which he
refcrsto as virtual.
Chapter 2 What Perception Is
Are we to say perception reveals objects as a light illuminates them in the night?
(EM 242)
2.0 The Divided Subject
"Perception is not a science of the world, it is not even an act, a deliberate taking up ofa
position; it is the background from which all acts stand out, and is presupposed by them"
(PP xi) As ''the darkness in the theater," the body's presence acts, for Merleau-Ponty, as
a kind of background, integral to understanding any situation, for anything to have
meaning for us. Seeing perception as only the deliberate taking up ofa position or view
misses the unity that is perception. It is, for Merleau-Ponty, the bodily history of the
unified perceiving subject that has been removed from the philosophical history of
perception. As a background, the body's history stands with it at every express
perception. Every express perception presupposes the body's mobility and the mobility
of the gaze as one. In an exchange of meaning that resists a tactile-visual dualism, "the
body's mobility is a natural consequence of my vision", Vision is mobile. What I see
does not make "me" (apan from my body) toward it, for in seeing I am already moving.
My body as a totality of experience is involved, and I project that body of experience
onto the world as it calls me to do, "not as an object represented, but as that highly
specific thing toward which we project ourselves" (PP 138). Because we cannot measure
this body of experience which I project, it will no longer be called the mobile body but, in
its fusing with the visual, it will be called virtual. In the movie theater, my eyes move out
to the screen, and in my perception is comained all the bodily interactions I've had with
objects that now allow me to understand what I see, I do not understand apart from the
body but through it. Perception is central because it is the most fundamemal expression
of what is non-mechanistic, non-causal about the body; perception is the working OUl of
the operative imentionality, the "essence" of the virtual body. Objects are grasped by
perception in a way which includes the tactile and the visual as one force.
We need to see why the body as a totality has been overlooked before moving on 10
discuss the full implications of Merleau-Ponty's theory of perception and its relation to
the virtual body in Chapter Three. It is interesting that the body is compared to the
darkness in the theater in Merleau-Ponty's metaphor. Light is often connected with the
"important" acts of the body, The capacity that has often been seen to link knowledge
and the body is vision. Hearing is perhaps considered the other knowledge-sense. The
"tactile senses", touch for instance, are usually considered lower on the scale. Animals
see things. for example, bUl while their vision is taken as an extension or means of their
'more sensuous' or tactile senses, i,e., they see things to eat, to drink, 10 mate with, our
seeing is taken as something that is beyond the tactile. References relating vision and
knowledge are common, contained in our everyday metaphors, i.e., I see what you mean,
it looks like you're right, I am/oel/sing on an idea, a light bulb above the head means an
idea, etc, Compared to the other senses, visual perception occupies a unique place in
understanding the world How has this connection traditionally played out in
philosophical teOlls?
Vision is often seen as a sense which tells us about the world, while the other senses
(touch, for instance) tell us only about our bodily vicinity. "Tactile", in other words, is a
description allotted to the senses for which close proximity to the body is necessary. This
is the limit of the tactile. Touch, taste, smell, and even hearing, while perhaps less so, are
understood as having only a "finite" bodily range of action. What is traditionally seen as
the limited power of the tactile senses rests in this "limited" range of action. The tactile
senses are seen, that is, as occupying a limited range of action in comparison to the "wide
ranging" powers of thought. For Merleau-Ponty, the body is always situated and, thus, so
is the subject. It is situated but it acts in a wide ranging way, according to Merleau-Ponty
Being situated is not limiting but a positive expression of our being in the world and is
thus part of an integrated theory ofunderstanding.
Merleau-Ponty maintains that the relationship between the tactile senses and situated
being is far more complex than is usually thought. The mistake is that we root the tactile
10 the spot; we fail to see it in tenns of possibility and rather tether the senses to the
surface of the body. Merleau-Ponty says that Descartes goes so far even as to consider
vision in this manner, writing, for instance, in the "Optics" of the science of perfecting
vision. Descartes writes about "all the things which are capable of making vision more
perfect" (Descartes, 60). One of these things is the telescope. The idea here is that, once
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magnified, the object sets off the structures of vision to a more perfect degree. In making
the object bigger, vision is made better. Perception is seen as a mechanism set offby an
object that is external to it, but also at the closest quantifiable distance. Merleau-Ponty
contends "the Cartesian concept of vision is modeled after the sense of touch" (EM 170).
That is, if the object is to be perfectly seen and examined with certainty, and the
examination is empirical observation, this action must take place at close quarters, i.e.,
through a telescope or through the hand grasping. If, for instance, one is unable to
directly observe an object in every aspect (like men or robots in coats and hats from
windows), judgment makes these details present - "judgment sees what I thought 1 saw
with my eyes". According to Merleau-Ponty, my judgment does nOI "keep them
present", the men in the street that Descartes judges are men, are present. The hats and
coats are walking around, with a certain gait, a certain kind of movement through the
world that our bodies recognize, thaI in this case mirrors that of our own bodies, and that
speaks to a relation between the tactile and the visual and understanding. As an
integrated visual-tactile-consciousness, the important parts of the relationships with
objects that I have previously had are not to be taken as intellectual en masse. These
fonner relationships have not just been learned and retained by my mind but by my
whole being, and are retained by my body. This phenomenal body does not need to touch
\vax, for instance, to recognize il from a distance as wax, but only has to have had a
previous tactile experience somehow akin to it which the body retains and expresses at
every new encounter- our previous tactile experience is always already in play.
It is never our objective body that we move,
but our phenomenal body, and there is no mystery
in that, since our body, as the potential of this
or that part of the world, surges towards objects
to be grasped and perceives them. (PP 106)
Memory, as we discussed in Chapter One is extended to the body by Merleau-Ponty.
:vtemory is always directly and specifically related to the new, in that the past only ever
means anything in relation to what comes next. The body, carrying with it its past with
every new encounter, is the site at which the past series of events extends into the next,
while at the same time always remaining situated. We cannot understand this connection
if we consider memory apart from the body, apart from the union of this visual and the
tactile, to which wc will turn soon in more detail.
What is wrong with the Cartesian idea of vision is that the structures and aims of
perception are mistakenly replaced or bypassed in favor of the structures and aims of
cognitIOn. The '"natural light of the mind" is a metaphor of vision collapsed into
cogmtlOn. Judgment, with vision as its handmaid, fills in where the body cannot go. "In
one fell swoop, Descartes removes action at a distance and relieves us of that ubiquity
which is the whole problem of vision". (EM 170) There has been a limit given to the
body which does not belong 10 it. What is action at a distance? How does action at a
distance work to show the relation between the body and understanding'!
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First of all, Merleau-Ponty contends that the removal of action at a distance, and the full
participation of the body in understanding, is implied by what he calls the "constancy
hypothesis". The "constancy hypothesis" states that there is a "point by point
correspondence and constant connection between the stimulus and the elementary
perception" (PP 7). In other words, such a hypothesis could not account, for instance,
for depth perception, but looks at the way the objects are arranged on the retina.
Merleau-Ponty believes that this kind of mistake is found in some philosophical
approaches 10 perception:
For God, who is everywhere, breadth is immediately
equivalent to depth. Intellectualism and empiricism
do not give us any account ofthe human experience
ofthe world; they tell us what Go<I might think of
it. (PP255)
Thus, depth is considered invisible unless it is conceived as breadth, which accounts for
the appeal of the constancy hypothesis. Depth perception is tied to perspective and not to
the relationship between things; "(depth] quite clearly belongs to perspective and not to
things" (PP 255). This renders the constancy hypothesis obsolete. The relationship
between objects, which renders depth visible, is one which is recognized due to the
body's panicipation in the development of spatial levels; near-far, up-do\\'ll elc. And,
whenever these relations are called up in perception, there is action at a distance
The law of constancy cannot avail itself. ..
(i]fwe tum back to the phenomena, they show
us that the apprehension of a quality, just as
that of size, is bound up with a whole perceptual
context, and that the stimulus no longer furnishes
us with Ihe indirect means of isolating a layer of
immediate impressions. (PP 8)
Sensation, and, I would say, the tactile senses in particular, were often conceived as an
effect, having a limited range of action and thus unsuited to the higher order functions of
understanding. "The sensible cannot be defined as the immediate effect of an external
stimulus" (PP 8) and Merleau-Ponty rejects this "definition of sensation in causal tenns"
(PP II), maintaining that it does not account for the complex web of action that the bo<!y
brings with it to every express perception. The tactile senses are usually understood as
significant in understanding only what is in the immediate to the body, what is near the
body. Merleau-Ponty's vicinity is the range of possibility afforded by the body in the
wider context of understanding. There is, for Merleau-Ponty, a hierarchy which subverts
the body as elementary in understanding, a hierarchy which is responsible for
"identifying 'elementary' psychic functions, and of distinguishing them from 'superior'
52
functions less strictly bound up with the bodily substructure" (PP 9). "The elementary
event is already invested with meaning, and the higher function will bring into being only
a more integrated mode of existence..." (PP 10). The lived bodily experience which is the
ground of the relation between sensation and understanding is one in which sensation
subsists beyond the immediate sense data 10 constitute an enduring part of understanding.
If the tactile ends in close proximity to the body, il would, then, seem as if tbe tactile is
immediate and temporary: a fleeting smell, the simple caress of well polished wood, or a
lump of wax. It would seem the tactile is not enduring, not like something that can be
visualized, imaged, remembered, in short, thought. This relegation of the tactile to the
immediate, to "simple" feeling, however, assumes that understanding, the continuity of
our experience and all it involves, memory, imagination, elC., is purely cognitive.
Judgment is seen to work within a fonnal system which uses data, while sensation is seen
to somehow provide the data. Vision usually occupies the status of a higher order
function because it is not seen as tied to the world by flesh (it is "more free" than Ihe
tactile) and because it aids in the fonnation of mental images. The data of the !actile is
often seen as something that must be translated, while Merleau-Ponty sees sensation as
having a direct relation of understanding 10 the world "Understanding" is nOl
"subsuming a sense datum under an idea" (PP 144).
For Merleau-Ponty there is a direct relation between the object and the sensation in which
an immediate incorporation of the subject's past takes place, which is simultaneous with
thought rather than subsumed under it Thought, and the fonnation of mental images, is
not the source of understanding'
The traditional notion of sensation was not a
concept born of reflection, but a late product of
thought directed towards objects, the last element
in the representation of the world, the furthest
removed from its original source, and therefore
the most unclear. (PP to)
In "An Unpublished Text", Merleau-Ponty outlines the two traditional views on
perception that have supported the idea that the mind is the unifying agent of sensation.
Empiricism conceives perception as "the action of external things on the body", where
the body is taken as "an automatic machine that needs an outside agent to set off its
pre-established mechanisms", and the mind is here understood as the unifier of
"impressions" into ideas. The body is something that is "set off', receptive, reactive
rather than active. Empiricism makes sensation into impressions, psychic images distinct
from physical movement. Thus, as Merleau-Ponty maintains in the "Primacy of
Perception": "[t)he originally given data of sensation are [wrongly conceived as)
fragmented, isolated, atomic entities, "oblivious" of each other, awaiting the intervention
of the activities of the mind for their relation into organized wholes. From the idealist
point of view, perception is a part of the autonomy of consciousness, an extension of
"pure contemplative consciousness imposed on a thing like body" (UT 3-4). Kant, for
example, understands sensation as a passive receptivity which supplies consciousness
with the raw materials which it unifies, formalizes and categorizes, activities unique to
consciousness. These philosophies commonly forget - in favor ofa pure exteriority or of
a pure interiority -the insertion of the mind in corporeality, the ambiguous relation which
we entel1ain with our body, and correlatively, with perceived things", (Primacy 4)
One way, then, to see the emergence of a distinction between the visual and the tactile is
in terms ofa subject-world relation understood as a relation of interior to exterior. The
bodily is usually seen as exterior, that which happens outside "me", unlike consciousness
or understanding, which is interior. Kant says, interestingly, that the hands are "an outer
brain of man" (PP 316). The focus on the inner as the seat of consciousness stal1ed
disappearing in later philosophies, sometimes being replaced with philosophies of
exteriority, in which everything is "co-primordial", to use Heidegger's phrase.
Merleau-Ponty's development of ala chair" (the flesh) in his later thought may seem to
put him into the category of a pure exteriority as well, one in which the subject
disappears into the "flesh oflhe world". We cannot go into this here, but suffice it to say
that, for Merleau-Ponty there must always be relation. We can see that with
Merleau-Ponty's idea of operative intentionality and what it entails - the reintegration of
vision with the body, the reintegration of the visual and the tactile and understanding -
understanding is nOI relegated to an inner seat of consciousness. Merleau-Ponty, rather
than shifting from interiority to exteriority, puts forward a theory of perception which
questions the use of such notions at all. The body is too often, Merleau-Ponty contends,
relegated to the external, that which does not involve awareness because it "happens",
while the "organizers" of experience have often been seen as internal (i.e., mind,
association, etc.) Merleau-Ponty blurs the lines of the inner and the outer, of vision and
touch, with the idea that the tactile history of the body is involved heavily in visual
activity and both in understanding: such a move mainlains the impossibility of making
the visual into impressions or mental representations and thus resists their subsequent
mental organization. Like the metaphors of perception (focus, etc.), Merleau-Ponty
wants to reclaim the metaphors of inner and outer as spatial-temporal metaphors in a
body world scheme. Certain binaries- internal-external, visual-tactile - are questioned, but
they are not done away with completely. We think, we dream. This is the evidence ofa
son of "inner" life. The point is that the pre-rellectivebody is pan of this life, it is a
pre-reflective foundation for thought. "Perceptual behavior emerges from these relations
to a situation and to an environment which are not the workings ofa pure and knowing
subjecl" (Primacy 4).
2.1 The Integration of the Tactile and the Visual
For Merleau-Ponty, a large pan of the misrepresentation of perception, and thus
understanding, rests, as I've said, in the traditional distinction made between the visual
and the tactile. The separation of the visual and the tactile into hierarchical rather than
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interrelated pans of a unified understanding is rejected by Merleau-Ponty. A divisive
theory of the relation of the visual and the tactile implies not only a mind-body dualism,
but a dualistic conception of the body. As a result, while visual perception is not really
taken as thought, it is not grouped under the heading of "the senses" either and thus
occupies a sort of limbo position, which is to say it is position-less, ascertained apart
from situated existence, If ......e do not consider the tactile aspect of perception we may,
like the idealists, believe that we "constitute the world":
. we can, at least as first sight, flatter
ourselves that we constitute the world, because
it presents us with a spectacle spread out before
us at a distance, and gives us the impression of
being immediately present everywhere and situated
nowhere. (Primacy 15)
Through ascertaining the connection between the tactile and the visual, and seeing the
body as pan of a unified structuring of our understanding of the world, Merleau-Ponty
wants to relocate perception in the world and reclaim the metaphors of light, perspective,
point of view, focus, etc., for a theory of understanding which includes the body as a
visual-tactile whole in a unified understanding
I cannot forget ... that it is through my body that
I go to the world, and tactile experience occurs
ahead of me, if it accords with a cenain nature of
my consciousness and if the organ which goes out to
meet it is synchronized with it. (Primacy 15)
With the idea thaI perception must be seen from the point of view of its position in the
phenomenal world, Merleau-Ponty rethinks the traditional distinction between the tactile
and the visual. Position has usually been reserved for the tactile body. Though the eyes
have been seen to have a position, the tearing away of vision from its own intentional
structure and the placing of structure beyond the body as a recipient rather than a fully
active entity have prevented perception from being seen in its true bodily being.
2.2 Perspective
I am not tied to anyone perspective but can change my
point of view, being under compulsion only in that
I must always have one, and can only have one at once-
let us say, then, that there arose a fresh possibility
o!simalions. The event of my binh has not passed
completely away, it has not fallen into nothingness
in the wayan event in the objective world docs,
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for it committed a whole future, not as a cause that
determines effect, but as a situation, once created, inevitably
leads to some outcome. There was henceforth a new setting, and
the world received a new layer of meaning. (PP 407)
The process of perception is understood as what Merleau-Ponty calls a transitive, or
perceptual, synthesis. "The synthesis which constitutes the unity ofthe perceived objects
and which gives meaning to the perceptual data is not an intellectual synthesis." (Primacy
15) Transitive synthesis involves the store of the body's knowledge of the world, which
is expressed in integrated visual-tactile activity. Transition, movement, in short, bodily
being, is a part of the synthesis of objects. Vision is rooted in the body's tactile relation
to the world, and thus to perspective. Perception, in Kant's notion of synthesis, for
instance, encounters that which appears, which is given and synthesized by higher
functions, rather than seeing the tactile as itself an active unifier of experience. Under
such an analysis, perception occupies a place within the intellecwal synthesis but thus
cannot occupy a view. "A transition synthesis does not link disparate perspectives but
brings about the passage from one to another." (PP 265)
With the integration of movement and vision the limited alternative of "seeing" from
either all perspectives or a one-to-one correspondence between object and vision is
overcome. Neither are realistic. Perception always involves seeing from somewhere.
Because the history of perception places it in a position only theoretically, under the
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experience error, it occupies no practical, bodily space, and thus no perspective. Such
theories of knowledge place vision at once at the level of mind and not at the level of
mind, i.e. either as "free ranging" thought or mechanism. The structures of perception
thus essentially view the world from "nowhere" (PP 67). If we want to know what
perception is, we have to look at the act of perception in terms of transition, not to either
site specific perception (i,e., under the constancy hypothesis and empiricism) or fully
possible perception, which is not considered positioned in the world at all under I 'analyse
reflexive. In other words, perception is tied to the mobile body rather than posited as a
philosophical principle.
Reflection never lifts itself out of any
situation, nor does the analysis of perception
do away with the fact of perception, the thisness
of the precept or the inherence of perceptual
consciousness in some temporality and some locality.
(PP42)
Merleau.Pomy maintains that maximum vision is expressed in the idea of "tending
toward" an "optimal view", the best perspective, through the spontaneous focus of our
gaze, which recognizes the '·optimum distance" from which an object is to be seen
clearly.
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For each object, as for each picture in an
art gallery, there is an optimum distance from
which it requires to be seen, a direction viewed
from which it vouchsafes most of itself: at a
shorter or greater distance we have merely a
perception blurred through excess or deficiency.
(PP302)
The spontaneous adjustment for optimum vision presupposes the lived structures of the
mobile gaze and its relationship to the mobile body. Depth, we remember, can only be
for a seeing body, not a God's eye. We do not decide that this or that is the best distance,
nor, we note, can we represent this distance to ourselves, but only discover it by
occupying it. We cannot discount the other objects in our line of vision when looking,
even if we do not expressly focus on them· such a relationship between objects and the
body is needed for the experience of depth perception. Optimum distance, depth
perception both, then, include an integrated sensory experience of the world. Thus,
according to Merleau-Ponty, the unity or "totality" of the gaze as the expression of
embodied existence is found in its relation and not its separateness from the other senses.
That is,
It is commonplace to say that we have five senses,
and it would seem at first glance, that each of them
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is like a world out of touch with the others ..
"But", he goes on to say,
My perception is not a sum of visual, tactile, and
audible givens, I perceive in a total way with my
whole being: I grasp a unique structure of the thing,
a unique way of being, which speaks to all my senses
at once. (FNP 49-50)
We cannot make this structure prior to its individual instantiations because these
instantiations are at the same time expressions of this unity. The totality of vision is thus
a totality that is never complete. The gaze is always potential, but in being bodily, it is
always situated. In blurring the lines between the situated and the open (i,e., in that
openness is reserved usually for the mind and situatedness for the body),
Mcrleau-Ponty gives perception back to the body and the body back to perception, and in
so doing he expands the horizons of both. This expansion of horizons is contained in the
idea of the virtual. We have established that the past is never there waiting to be
discovered and recalled but is rather lived. As living, our relationship to the visual is now
no longer seen as a relation to the exterior that is made into a menial representation. Thus
Merleau-Ponty has gone beyond the "Husserlian account ofintentionality...which
portrays our relation to the world as the conscious and self-conscious idea or mental
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representation of things" (Johnson, 27). What alternative has Merleau-Ponty left us for
talking about the relationship between the eye and the image?
2.3 True and False Vision
Only the painter is entitled 10 look without being
obliged 10 appraise what he sees. (EM 161)
Merleau-Ponty moves away from making activity and being in general a series of
deliberate acts (under the causal intentional structure discussed in Chapter One),
subsumed under laws of consciousness. Seeing experience in this way stems, he says,
from the overarching preoccupation, not with what is present but with what is true'
However necessary this verification may be,
specifying criteria and demanding from our
experience its credentials of validity, it is
not aware of our contact with the perceived world
which is simply there before us, beneath the level
of the true and false. (UT 3)
Again, Merleau-Ponty talks about the body as "beneath" other "levels" of experience.
6J
Again, the level of beneath must be seen as foundational but not casually so, The body
does not cause the mind to think. Perception is involved in so far as the emergence of the
visual scene is at once new and foundational for judgment.
In order that I may recognize the tree as a tree,
it is necessary that, beneath this familiar meaning,
the momentary arrangement of the visible scene should
begin all over again, as on the very first day of the
vegetable kingdom, to outline the individual idea of
this tree. Such would be natural judgment, which
cannot yet know its reasons for it is in the process
of creating them. (PP 44)
Perception is once again seen as a kind of "natural judgment", Motility was seen as a
"nalUral consequence" of vision. Both vision and motility are viewed not at the level of
the cognitive true and false but within a field of presence, in which the body interacts
with the world, in which seeing and seeing truly are one and the same thing.
In the development of his philosophy between the Phenomenology 0/Perceptioll and The
Visible and the Invisible, Merleau-Ponty no longer makes a distinction between the level
of the true and the level of perception. In the Phenomenology 0/Perception, he says
"perception is beneath the level of the true and false", In The Visible and the I/lvisible,
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Merleau-Pomy writes:
It is our experience of inhabiting the world by
our body, of inhabiting the truth of our whole
selves without there being need to choose nor even
to distinguish between the assurance of seeing and
the assurance of seeing the true, for in principle
they are one and the same thing. (VI 28)
Thus, for Merleau-Ponty, value is closely aligned with bodily being, and, any rift
between thought and movement, knowledge and action, mind and body is, if not
overcome, at least heavily put into question.
Chapter 3 Habit, Gesture and Ihe Acquisition of Meaning
Ifhabit is neither a fonn of knowledge nor an
involuntary aClion what is it? (PP 144)
Habit has its abode neither in thought nor in the
objective body but in the body as the mediator of the
world. (PP 145)
3.0 The Acquisition of Meaning Through Habit and The Body Image
For Merleau-Ponty, there is a switch to seeing understanding as in part an "I can", a
doing, an unfolding, rather than a cognitive, constituting power. Consciousness as an "I
can" refutes the idea that awareness is essentially self-reflective, and, in this context, the
visual does not take the fonn of mental representation, seen as opposed to physical
movement. Perception must not be held to be "the vision upon which I reflect"- for "[
cannot think except as thought" (EM 176), The unity of consciousness, ofthe
understanding subject, must be sought, then, in examining why there is a meaningful
world for us, from which the subject cannot be understood in isolation, or in a
constituting relation. [n so doing, he looks al self-reflexivity, the awareness of oneself as
a subject in relation to other subjects, as bodily
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Other people and objects are part of our world not just in being taken up, nor are they
constituted by us. Merleau-Ponty advocates looking at the experience of otherness rather
than supporting analysis which posits a formal distinction between self and other (Smith,
41). He does so, in part, by focusing on the bodily pressure things exert on us. The
"position" of other objects in the world, as they are arranged in relation to our bodily
being, both open paths and positions available to us as well as closing other ones. We are
presented with our bodily position in the world not through reflection but through what
Merleau-Ponty calls habit. "Bodily position is presented to us through habit." (PP 143) It
is habit that
elucidates the nature of the body image. When we say
that it presents us immediately with our bodily
Position, we do not mean, after the manner ofthe empiricists,
that I consists ofa mosaic of 'extensive sensations'
It is a system which is open on to the world, and correlative
withit.(PP 143)
With the notion of habit, Merleau-Ponty elucidates the idea that being open to ourselves
(what is often seen as cognition or self-reflexivity) is already included in being open to,
or towards, other people and objects. The unity between self-reflection and the body
found in habit, is pan of having a meaningful experience of both ourselves and others.
"We know the range and vicinity of these objects [of "others"] as well as we know that of
our own body". (PP 143) Perception thus includes a unified self-awareness in its activity
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Like the world's unity, that of the [is invoked
rather than experienced each time I perform an act
of perception, each time I reach a self-evident
truth, and the universal 1 is the background against
which all those acts stand out. (PP 406)
Seeing oneselfas a thinking thing in an extended world, or any version of this, is
eradicated. The self-awareness which is expressed in perception is one which includes
the projection ofa body image
Our body image changes with new experiences, or, more precisely, it is invoked in a
slightly new way. "Habit expresses our power of dilating our being-in-the-world, or
changing our existence by appropriating fresh instruments". (PP 143) Appropriating
fresh instruments means encountering and understanding something new. To learn how
to do something (to appropriate a fresh instrument) is to newly develop a familiarity with
the object, a familiarity that is then written into the body's behavior, and becomes a new
part of the body image. Knowing how to type, for example, involves "knowledge in the
hands, which is forthcoming only when the effort is made, and cannot be fonnulated in
detachment from that effort". (PP 146) We have seen, however, that the effort of typing,
which involves "knowledge in the hands", is in fact made even when the object is seen.
"1 only have to see something to know how to reach it and deal with it." (EM 163) It is
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all part of the effort made by the unified body.
For Merleau-Ponty, I am "caught up in the fabric of the world" and "my body is a thing
among things, but because it moves itself and sees it holds things in a circle around it"
(EM 163). This holding, this "intentional arc", is at once a visual arc. It does not mean I
hold things or grip them with the muscles of my hands. It does not mean I have a mental
grip on things. Rather, it means that my history as a bodily being allows me co orient
myself anew in new situations. In seeing a lamp, for instance, "I do not represent the
unseen sides of the lamp to myself' (Primacy 13). The unseen side is "filled in" by my
operative intentionality. "The hidden side is present in its own way, it is in my Vicinity"
(Primacy 14), Being in my vicinity, it counts for me, but it is never posited as a complete
object, as in a representationalist account would suggest. Rather, to say that the other
counts for me, is to say that its meaning is accessible without the need for me to impose a
conceptual framework onto it every time r see it.
For example, in the cinema, we are often presented with partial views of objects. We see
a door, for example, but we know the door is part ofa building. We know too that a
building is a standing structure with four sides and a roof. We do not imagine, in a scene
in an apartment, that the actor strides through a wall and disappears. When she leaves
one room, we know she enters another. The unseen sides, in other words, are filled in by
us. How do we do this? We could say, in one respect, that we have had practice. The
cinema experience has, in the age of the projected moving image, formed part of our
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body experience. It is interesting to note how this forming has progressed. When
"talkies" arrived on the scene people were at first surprised at the sounds "coming from
another room", which was not seen in the shot. The untrained ear and eye hadn't yet
progressed that far: the body image was not developed to that capacity yet. But, back to
the door and the building. can we say that we understand the door conceptually
represents the building? Merleau-Ponty would say the door qua building counts or has
meaning for me, because, although it does not appear on the screen, nor is it filled in
conceptually, it still remains in the range of my bodily vicinity. In other words, I
understand the new situation always through the projection of the body image.
Because I am a body, I have an affinity to objects which is prior to a conceptual
framework. The concept derives its meaning from this pre-established affinity with
objects. And, upon seeing an object, both the concept (what the object is) and the use
(how I deal with it) are invoked at once. "The intentional object is offered to the
spectator at the same time as the object itself' (PP 185-186). Thus,
The subject, when put in front of his scissors,
needle and familiar tasks, does not need to look
for his hands or his fingers, because they are not
objects to be discovered in objective space: bones,
muscles and nerves, but potentialities already
mobilized by the perception of the scissors or needle,
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the central end of those intentional threads which
link him to the objects given. (PP 106)
We have been saying throughout the paper that all the body's fanner positions are
included, as a pan of the living past, described in Chapter One, in being able to recognize
an object from a single perspective. We now see that habit is Mcrleau-Ponty's tenn for
the power to do this, and that he calls this power the body image: the body is constantly
replenished through habit. "The face or back of a piece of material is intelligible only for
a subject who can approach the object from one side or another side". (PP 430) Again,
the film always only presents us with sides of objects. We know, for instance, in Fritz
Lang's "Metropolis", that the workers live underground, not because anyone told us, but
because we see them ascending. In other words, the subject projects a world of
movement onto its present field of understanding. In this way, "[e]very perceprual habit
is still a motor habit" (PP 153). The same, as we said, can be said of using an object
Appropriating a fresh instrument entails the coming together of the old and the new, the
body's past and its present situatedness. "We say that a body has understood and habit
has been cultivated when it has absorbed a new meaning, and assimilated a fresh core of
significance." (PP 146) Thus, habit does not mean - as it usually does - something done
over and over again without anything new, for "[t]he acquisition ofa habit is indeed the
grasping of a significance but it is the motor grasping of a motor significance'· (PP 142).
Merleau-Ponty's panicular twist on the relationship between significance and
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understanding comes out of his attempt to trace the genesis or development of meaning as
ongoing in experience; experience itself is pregnant with meaning or as, Merleau-Ponty
maintains, "matter is pregnant with its fonn". We can but note this attempt here.
Merleau-Ponty maintains that the ideas of "meaning as either mechanical causation or as
the working out of an idea ... have oscillated between empiricism and idealism". (SN
xvii) Meaning is afforded, for Merleau-Ponty, by the subject's integrated experience of
the world expressed by perception.
Merleau-Ponty holds that meaning is something of which we need not only be
self-reflectively or cognitively aware. Rather than a relation between an aim that can be
articulated as having meaning on its own even before it relates to a given object (as a
condition and its sense datum), Merleau-Ponty regards meaning as present at the level of
habit. "[T]he given is a route, an experience which gradually clarifies itse]f" (PP 38)
The body follows the route which remains open for acts of perception, Merleau-Ponty
describes objects as "a totality of things toward which we project ourselves" (PP 387),
For example, we know how to drive a car through a narrow passage, and can manipulate
this object without scraping the wall because our bodies contain this knowledge, we have
followed this route. We do not need to measure the distance between the car and the wall.
Rather, understanding the geometrical relationship between objects - for this relationship
to have any meaning, the pre-reflective relationship between world and subject is
necessary
Thus there is an immediacy involved in seeing, in the sense that, for Merleau-Ponty, there
are "spontaneous" encounters with the visible. That is, we do not impose a conceptual
framework on the visible in order 10 understand it. But this does not mean, as some have
interpreted it, that perception remains essentially passive for Merleau-Ponty. ltjust
means that the conceptual framework is already contained in perception, which is part of
understanding, rather than the transmitter of the visual to cognition. II means that
perception is always already meaningful.
3.1 Gesture and Meaning
A clearer articulation of the exception of counting or meaning to the pre-reflective is
often expressed by Merleau-Ponty through the idea of "gesture". "The sense of the
gesture is not given but understood, that is, on the spectator's part. The whole difficulty is
to conceive the act clearly without confusing it with a cognitive operation:' (PP 185-186)
We will tum to the gesture, then, to further explore the relation between the body and
meaning in Merleau-Ponty.
It is interesting to note a discussion on the gesture by Giorgio Agemben, found in his
book Injancy and His/ory: The Destruction ofExperience, in part because Agamben
relates the gesture to the cinema, which has been our pet example
Agamben maintains that, in our society, there has been "an effacement and loss of the
gesture" (Agemben, 137), When we interpret art, for instance, we look at it as a static
image, a "mythical fixity". "Because the researches were conducted by means of images,
it believed that the image was also their object." (Agamben, 138) We recall
Merleau-Ponty's discussion oflhe experience error, in which perception is seen as made
up of the conlents of the perception rather than of the relation between the viewer and the
world. For Agamben, the cinematic image is not "a hardened crystal of historical
memory" (Agemben, I38), or images made into objects for a representational theory of
perceplion, 10 use Merleau-Ponty's framework. Agamben maintains that "we should nOI
really speak of images [when talking about art, for example], bUI of gestures" (Agamben,
139), The cinema provides, for Agamben, a rich example of "Ihe freeing of the image in
the gesture" (Agamben, 139). It is difficult to see the gesture in tenns ofa stalic image,
and more difficult still to understand it as a representation. This is due to the body
movement inherent in the gesture; it is therefore a perfect concept for Merleau-Ponty.
The "suspicion" of the seen world which we discussed in Chapter One was really a
suspicion of perception and the body's ability to understand what it sees without the aid
of mediating representations. For Agamben, "in the cinema, a society that has lost ils
gestures seeks to reappropriate what it has lost while simultaneously recording that loss"
(Agamben, 137)
For Merleau-Pomy the cinema is special because it helps us to see, even more clearly
than when we examine everyday perception, how Ihe body image is involved in
understanding what we see. We must find out what is bodily about perception
Merleau-Ponty compares the gesture and the film, to the extent that the meaning of both
are a matter of our ability to experience the world as meaningful in an immediate way,
without having to apply another level of conceptual analysis. Merleau-Ponty's problem
with {'analyse reflexive, we remember, is that the essential starting point is that meaning
is applied to an a raw, unmeaning world·
The meaning of a film is incorporated into its rhythm
just as the meaning ofa gesture may immediately
be read in that gesture: the film does not mean
anything other than itself. (FNP 58)
The film means nothing other than itself, even though it means to us alone. In other
words we do not give the film meaning, but, like the gesture, someone must experience
meaning in it. We do not decipher the world from the perspective of an isolated
understanding, but, due to our bodily existence, by being caught up in the bodily flow and
rhythm of the world. The gesture - the contortion of the face which we immediately
understand as anger for instance - is a simple analogy for Merleau.Ponty, of how we do
not apply a concept to our engagement with the world, but, rather, derive concepts from
our engagement with the world
A movie has meaning in the same way a thing does
neither of them speaks 10 an isolated understanding:
rather both appeal to our power tacitly to decipher
the world or men. It is true that we lose sight of
this aesthetic value of the tiniest perceived thing.
(FNP 58)
This means, as we have been saying all along, that for Merleau-Ponty, meaning has a
bodily dimension. The temporal and spatial arrangements are invoked spontaneously in
perception. Art, and most specifically here cinema, serves well to show how the body is
involved in the way things acquire meaning, for the arrangement of the elements of a film
are contained in a closed frame which enhances the perceptual experience. We encounter
a rich succession of images, each of which acquires more meaning in relation to the
previous frame. In other words it is a concentrated, developing and meaningful object
Thejoy of an lies in its showing how something
takes on meaning- not by referring to already
established and acquired ideas but by the temporal
or spatial arrangements of elements. (FNP 58)
The temporal or spatial arrangement the elements of the film are not applied by us, for
the very elements we are talking about do not exist outside our relation with objects in the
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world. There is nothing beyond the object that means something to us, which we use
another, pre-bodily set of categories to decipher
The meaning of the gesture is not behind it, it is
intenningled with the structures of the world,
Outlined by the gesture itself ... as my eyes and
movements discover the world. (PP 185.186)
When we turn to the projection oflbe body image as a vinual activity by the body, it is
clear that the meaning this act allows is not, like the understanding of I 'analyse reflexive,
separate from the act itself.
3.2 In-Habiting the Spectacle
To get used to a hat, a car ora stick is to be transplanted into them. (PP 143)
The film is a spectacle. We see it laid out before us. But it is not to a flat screen that we
relate, but to space in which we can discern depth, relation between levels (up-down, etc.)
We can also, from the appearance on the screen of the back of a person or object, "infer"
what the entire object in fact is. We are more familiar with the moving picture than the
still photograph; Merleau~Ponty says, "everyone recognizes his own silhouette when
filmed" even though "we have been able to show that we do not recognize our own hand
in a photograph" (PP 149). He maintains that "we immediately recognize the visual
representation of what is invisible to us in our own body" (PP 149). We, as
Merleau-Ponty would put it, "inhabit" the spectacle (PP 250), when we spontaneously
project the body image onto it. The spectacle is always, at the same time, a setting. One
does not just see the world but in seeing fully inhabits it. Included in "habit fanning",
then, is "in-habiting" the world. The body concurrently inhabits spatially and temporally.
We have seen that the range of activities ofthe body is extended from direct physical
contact by Merleau-Ponty with the unity of the history and possibility of the visual and
the tactile: "when I say I see an object at a distance I mean I hold it, it is in the future or
in the past as well as being in space" (PP 265).
Because we must inhabit the spectacle in order to understand it, objects "count" as
Merleau-Ponty puts it, as non-objective, because, as the phenomenon of counting shows,
the body is not an object. The distinction between an objectified body space and
phenomenal body space is that while the former's relations are measurable relations the
latter is measured by the always active expression of the body's attraction for objects.
Speaking of our "partial" access to objects in the phenomenal field, (i,e., we never see all
the sides of the cube at once) the unseen parts, as Merleau-Ponty puts it, "count": "[t]he
other parts of the field are not represented to me by some operation of memory or
judgment, they are present to me, they count for me" (FNP 51).
The movie provides a setting in which the body as an object of science cannot enter. This
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sening or cinematic space, is entered not by the material body, nor by a "body of
knowledge", or cognitive functioning. It is, instead, the domain of the virtual body, a
concept to which we will now tum.
Conclusion: The Virtual Body
With Merleau-Ponty's approach to intentionality, access to the sensible past, and his
reintegration in the body of the co-active visual and tactile, the range of the body's
possible movements is not available to cognition alone as object, concept or
representation. Nor, however, can we look for the significance of the body in its
particular movements only, that is, in ''measuring'' the position and trajectory of the body
in relation to other objects. It is the potential for understanding, which is radically
indistinguishable from ongoing presence of the body that is at issue. The range of
movement is neither an expression of mind (movement is not thought about movement),
nor is it a mechanism independent of bodily intentional activity. There must be, then, in
the work of Merleau-Ponty a middle term. Again we reiterate the idea that opened Ihis
chapter: "[h]abit has its abode neither in thought nor in the objective body but in the
body as the mediator of the world" (PP 145) How does Merleau-Ponty articulate this
"body as mediator"?
The term "virtual" in Merleau-Ponty is more complex than our ordinary understanding of
the word as "almost real". It is precisely the distinction and limited choice between the
real and the ideal which Merleau-Ponty tries to avoid with the virtual body. The term
virtual comes from the Latin word vir/us meaning power or potency. Merleau-Ponty uses
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the tenn virtual in this sense. The body has a power of possibility, of understanding,
which both surpasses and includes the physical. This belief in the body's "power", which
as we wiil see is always expressed in non-positing relational acts with objects, is
expressed in perception. Perception, as we have seen, refers for Merleau-Ponty, to an
integration of sense experience. Vinual activity is always the coming together of the
visual and the tactile. All my senses are used to watch a film, not in a direct sense (I
don't touch the screen) but I trace the contours of the objects on the screen with my
vinual body. What can this mean? It means Ihat the history of my tactile existence is
expressed with every perception and thus bodily experience is the active ground of
understanding and meaning.
The film, the ultimate virtual space, serves as a critical test for understanding the virtual
body. The film world cannot be reduced in a reflexive sense to the lived world. That is, it
is not a strictly a representation of realilY. The film is given to us as an enhancement of
the visible. The flash back, for instance, is something which we all experience in
everyday life, but it is never laid out before us in a visual way as it is in the film, The
film is not a representation in any meaningful sense, nor is it experienced in a
representational way. That is, the film, and to an enhanced degree genres such as sci-fi
and animation, offer a new configuration of reality. Because we understand what is
happening in a film, we see (in some small way) how meaning cannot be reduced to the
lived world in a reflexive sense. Because we understand in a non-representational way,
that is, in a way that includes the body-subject's being-towards-the-world, we can inhabit
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the world of the film.
rilm will be dismissed by some as unsuitable material for discovering the real or true
structures of understanding. This is so, however, only when the film experience itself is
taken as purely representational, which is achieved through bypassing the presence and
situated starns of the body. The projected image is given the starns of an image-sign for
the "real" object: Rosebud on the screen is a representation of the Rosebud in the props
room in the studio. Whatever else Rosebud may mean in Citizen Kane is, say the
psychoanalytic film theorists, added by the viewer and can be reduced to the
psychological states the subject brings to the cinema with her. In a similar way, I'analyse
reflexive assumes that the understanding subject can exist before its encounters with the
world. The world can be taken up by this already established subject, who can use
representation to understand thai which has never seen. In both the case of film theory
that has forgotten the visual and philosophy that has forgotten the body, the image is
forgotten for representation.
In the cinema, vision and movement discover the world not by covering space (i.e., we do
not encounter the image through a purely tactile encounter). Nor do we discover the
world as in a purely visual encounter. That is, we do not touch the angles and dimensions
of the screen but nor do we just register what we see on the retina. The screen is flat and
yet we discern shapes angles. up, down, bars, falling, etc. We do not, Merleau-PonlY
would say, see without the elementoflhe tactile in place to make sense of what we see.
Merleau-Ponty claims as one of the aims of the Phenomenology ofPerception finding a
middle tennlaltemative between the "for me" and the "in itself' (PP 428). "The for me
says man is the constituting consciousness, the in itself says he is pan of the world
Neither view is satisfactory." (SN. 72) Neither view is satisfactory because each
assumes, but does not include, the pre-reflective fund of bodily experience, that which
makes it possible to separate the "for me" and the "in itself' and the first place. The
categories "subject" and "object" arise out of this assumption, and all intentional powet is
given to the subject, wherein lies the possibility of a constituting mind. The body retains
the role of object, without intentionality, and is reduced to its mechanisms, one of the
"contents" of the subject's experience. BUI, Merleau-Ponty writes, and we come back
again to the imponance of space,
We cannot understand the experience of space either
in tenns of the consideration of contents or that of
some pure unifying activity; we are confronted with
that third spatiality which is neither that of things
in space, nor that of spatiaIizing space. (PP 248, my
italics)
In order to understand what Merleau-Ponty means by saying that the body is a mediator
in the world, outside the traditional conceptions of the "in itself' and the "for itself' we
have to look at what he means by this "third spatiality". It is, I suggest, a kind of
"virtual" body space. It refers to the body (or, more specifically, the body image), which
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through perception, is projected outward onto the field of its experience. My body is,
materially, here in the seat, but it virtually up on the screen- it acts at a distance. The
virtual body extends the power of the body in understanding beyond its traditional roles
of image machine or movement machine· in short the body is extended beyond the role
of transmitter. The virtual unifies mind and body and along with this, it unifies the
psychic image and movement, in consciousness.
Comparing Ihe psychic blindness patient, who can perform only acts that he can represent
to himself, to the "normal" person, Merleau-Ponty writes:
The body of the nonnal person arouses a kind of
potential movement rather than an actual one; the
pan of the body in question sheds it anonymity,
is revealed, by the presence of a particular tension,
as a certain power of action within the framework
of the anatomical appararus.(PP 109)
The actions of the normal person are at once general (i.e., presuppose a bodily history)
and particular, include a "particular tension", a ·'certain power of action". The notion of a
"virtual body". the body which inhabits the spectacle, is one which includes the specific
situation and the body's history come together in activity. Where, for instance, does body
movement occur in the theater? The alternatives seem clear enough. The bodies of the
actors on the screen, or, if we take a microscope, the colors on the screen, the pixels
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move, At least they seem, to us, to be moving, Another alternative is - as we said at the
start - that we, the spectators move, shifting in our seats, etc. Certainly, these arc the
only places a representationalist approach would find movement. The significance of
movement is not seen here as the relation ofborly to film but, rather, is conceived in a
third person account or analysis of movement. The reason the film is considered a
representation in the first place is Ihal, seen "from above", the significance of the body in
the theater is measurable (two feet from this wall, moves "us" around, etc.) as weU as
essentially passive in understanding the movie. In the cinema we are confronted with a
simation in which space is not, to put it crudely, explicitly "covered" by the body. Are
we left with the other alternative of seeing the body as insignificant, while the mind's
representing power takes over? Does this mean an analysis of body movement is
insignificant? But, is there not a third body, aside from the one on the screen and Ihe
shifting body in the seat? This third body, for Merleau-Ponty, apart from the physical
body in the seat that can be (externally) measured and Ihe body on the screen is the
virtual body:
What counts for the orientation of the spectacle is
not my body as it in fact is, as a thing in objective
space, but as a system of possible actions, a virtual
body with its phenomenal place defined by its task and
situation, My body is wherever there is something to be
done (PP250)
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Merleau-Ponty's work marks a radical departure from what we often mean for the bo<!y to
do something. We have already seen that intentionality is not exhausted by particular
aims, and nor is action. We don't have to catch the body in the present act, it is not
"snuffed out when it is not in [a particular] action" (PP 435). The notion of action
(neither pure, nor motor) is broadened to include the meaning of the body's being toward
things:
The abstract movement carves out, within that plenum
of the world in which concrete movement took place,
a zone of reflection and subjectivity; it superimposes
upon physical space a virtual or human space. (PP Ill)
Vision itself aims at things through the body, through
its gaze. It is never our objective body thaI we move,
but our phenomenal body, and there is no mystery in that,
since our body, as the potential of this or that part
oflhe world, surges towards objects to be grasped and
perceives them. (PP 106)
The body, under Merleau-PonlY's account of the virtual, lakes on a meaning thaI has
often eluded it in philosophical inquiry. That is, it occupies a middle ground between Ihe
poles that analysis sets up when it forgets experience. The poles of mind and body,
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image and movement, of truth and illusion, of inner and OUler. In so doing,
Merleau-Ponty's theory or non-representational understanding opens up a new arena for
meaning, one in which the body can move, and in which I can watch a film
Summary
In this paper, I have examined the relationship between the body and understanding in the
work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. In so doing, I have articulated what situated existence
and the body subject-object relations inherent in situated existence - means when it is not
seen as separate from consciousness or understanding. This articulation reveals Merleau-
Ponty's particular contribution to the age old mind-body question. Through the virtual
body, and the conception of action at a distance (that is, the union of the visual and the
tactile in our oriented understanding of the world) Merleau-Ponty presents us with a new
alternative 10 seeing organization and meaning in tenus of either material or mind. He
attempts 10 bring together the realms of intention and operation or action, focusing on
possibility rather than articulating the origins of meaning and understanding in the
cognitive subject. In tenus of understanding and meaning, Merleau-Ponty focuses on the
subject-world relation (i.e. how it is possible that the world acquires order and meaning
for us) rather than order (or, more particularly, how it is that we, as essentially cognitive
subjects, bring order and meaning to a raw, meaningless world).
Thus, as I have tried to show, central to the acquiring of meaning is Merleau-Ponty's
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focus on presence rather than a fonn of representational consciousness. Operative
intentionality, rather than self-reflexivity, fonns the ground of meaning in Merleau-
Ponty's work, His rejection ofl'analyse reflexive is an affinnation of the situated relation
between the body and the image, and rejects the reduction of everything to a relation
between the cognitive subject and the psychic or mental image, or representation. As my
analysis of perception has shown, this body - image relation is always seen withing the
context of the whole body -world relation - in which the visual and the tactile fonn one
unified body schema. The idea ofvinual space articulates this relation between bo<ly and
world as a manifestation of the body's contribution to understanding.
When we watch a film, the body is involved in a vinual way. However, as I have also
tried to show, the virtual body is not limited to the film theater. The body in its virtual
manifestation foons the background of all of our experience, and is the working ground
of understanding for Merleau-Ponty.
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